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The Political Economy of Discretionary 
Spending: Evidence from the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
ABSTRACT  We study in this paper the spatial allocation of expenditures 
in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), one of the largest 
discretionary funding bills in the history of the United States. Contrary to both 
evidence from previous fiscal stimulus programs and standard theories of 
legislative politics, we do not find evidence of substantial political targeting. 
The districts of party leaders did not receive more funds than those of rank-
and-file legislators, nor did the districts of pivotal voters in the Senate or swing 
voters in the House receive more money. While Democratic districts overall 
received more per resident than Republican districts, this differential nearly 
disappears when we consider award per worker in each district or when we 
control for district poverty rate. Democratic states did receive modestly greater 
funds, but this is largely due to higher levels of funding going to places with 
more generous state welfare programs. At the same time, we find no relationship 
between the amount awarded and measures of the severity of the downturn in 
the local economy, while we do find more funds flowing to districts with higher 
levels of economic activity and greater incidence of poverty. The results are 
consistent with the discretionary component of ARRA being allocated through 
funding formulas or based on project characteristics other than countercyclical 
efficacy or political expediency, which stands in contrast to evidence from fiscal 
stimulus in the New Deal. One explanation suggests that over the past century, 
legislative norms have reduced the scope of discretion—with attendant benefits 
and costs.
376 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring 2014
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, other-wise known as the Obama stimulus bill, was one of the largest discre-
tionary spending bills in U.S. history. At the time of its passage, it allocated 
a total of $787 billion, consisting of $212 billion in tax cuts, $267 billion in 
entitlement programs, and $308 billion in discretionary projects awarded 
through contracts, grants, and loans. Passed during the Great Recession, the 
stated aim of ARRA was to appropriate funds “for job preservation and cre-
ation, infrastructure investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance 
to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization.”1 In his remarks 
during the bill signing, President Obama emphasized the multiplicity of the 
mandate to create jobs and to do so by pursuing high-quality projects:
What makes this recovery plan so important is not just that it will create or save 
three and a half million jobs over the next two years, including nearly 60,000 in 
Colorado. It’s that we are putting Americans to work doing the work that America 
needs done in critical areas that have been neglected for too long—work that will 
bring real and lasting change for generations to come.2
In other words, the purpose of the act was to stimulate the economy, 
provide assistance to the unemployed, and expand provision of high-quality 
public goods. In this broad panoply of goals, the most important was to 
provide economic stimulus using fiscal policy. In the words of then House 
Minority Leader John Boehner, “The president made clear when we started 
this process that this was about jobs. Jobs. Jobs. Jobs.”3 In fact, the bill 
became popularly known as the “Obama stimulus bill,” emphasizing its goals 
for recovery.
In this paper, we study the allocation of the funds in ARRA, with an eye 
toward several objectives. First, given the bill’s size and significance, under-
standing how and where the money was spent is important in and of itself. 
Second, we use this bill to test theories from political economy in order 
to learn about the legislative process and the distribution of government 
spending in general. Finally, ARRA provides an opportunity to examine the 
political economy of a particular type of government spending—namely, 
fiscal policy for the purpose of macroeconomic stabilization—and in doing 
so, we consider the implications for improving the design of such policies.
1. Quoted from the ARRA Preamble. The full text of the bill may be found at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr1enr.pdf.
2. New York Times, February 17, 2009 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/
americas/17iht-17textobama.20261060.html).
3. Quoted in “Recovery Bill Gets Final Approval,” New York Times, February 13, 2009 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/us/politics/14web-stim.html).
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Two prior papers have also looked at the distribution of funds in ARRA. 
Robert Inman (2010) conducts a state-level analysis and finds that fund-
ing formulas explain most of the cross-state variation. We conduct a similar 
analysis and find similar results at the state level, but we find that different 
funding formula variables matter at the district level. James Gimpel, Frances 
Lee, and Rebecca Thorpe (2013) conduct a county-level analysis and find 
no role for the unemployment rate in the allocation of funds across counties. 
Our study is more comprehensive than either of these two, and our analysis 
focuses on the district level, which is not covered in either.
There are a number of competing views about how funds would be 
distributed in actual practice. One view, consistent with the administra-
tion’s stated goal of providing stimulus, is that the geographic distribution 
of expenditures would reflect the economic evidence on fiscal multipliers. 
Recent evidence suggests that state and local multipliers are larger in areas 
with greater excess capacity (Dube, Kaplan, and Zipperer 2014; Nakamura 
and Steinsson 2014; Shoag 2010). Thus, we might expect funds to be 
targeted toward areas that were more heavily exposed to the economic 
downturn—for example, areas with larger increases in unemployment. 
In addition, David Johnson, Jonathan Parker, and Nicholas Souleles (2006) 
document that individuals with low levels of income and low levels of 
liquidity respond more strongly to stimulus. We might therefore expect 
areas with higher levels of unemployment or higher rates of poverty to 
receive more money, due to the belief that targeting transfers toward these 
individuals would lead to higher multipliers and more job creation.
An alternative view of the stimulus bill is that it would be filled with pork 
barrel projects. Less than two weeks before the signing of the bill, the future 
head of the House budget committee, Representative Paul Ryan, referred to 
the bill as a “bloated porkfest” in an interview with the conservative news 
agency, Newsmax.4 This view was widely reported in much of the main-
stream press, including CNN5 and the Washington Post.6 The view of the 
stimulus bill as pork-laden is still common today. Edward Krosner, former 
editor of Newsweek, New York magazine, Esquire, and the New York Daily 
News, wrote in a 2014 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “Mr. Obama repeated 
4. “‘Porkfest’ Will Crush Economy, Rep. Ryan Says,” Newsmax, February 10, 2009 
(http://www.newsmax.com/RonaldKessler/Obama-stimulus-pork/2009/02/10/id/328187/).
5. “What GOP Leaders Deem Wasteful in Senate Stimulus Bill,” CNN, February 4, 2009 
(http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/02/gop.stimulus.worries/index.html).
6. “Despite Pledges, Stimulus Has Some Pork,” Washington Post, February 13, 2009 (http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/12/AR2009021203502.html).
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the rookie mistake he made with the stimulus bill, which became a bloated 
porkfest.”7
The political economy literature provides further predictions about the 
pattern of spending. One theory is that politicians act in the interests of 
their party. Therefore, we might expect to see parties directing funds toward 
marginal districts in order to improve the electoral success of the party. 
However, there is a long-standing literature in political science suggesting 
that the United States, having a majoritarian political system, has weak politi-
cal parties (Baron 1991; Shor 2006a; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001). 
Indeed, using a regression discontinuity design, David Albouy (2013) finds 
that states where a majority of congressional districts are aligned with 
the party of the president receive a relatively small and statistically insig-
nificant 2.6 percent more in intergovernmental transfers from the federal 
government relative to states where a majority of congressional districts are 
aligned with the opposite party. Boris Shor (2006a; 2006b) finds similar 
results for the allocation of funds in state legislatures. In contrast, using 
less well identified but more representative panel methods, Christopher 
Berry, Barry Burden, and William Howell (2010) find that counties whose 
congressional representative is aligned with the party of the president do 
receive more funds.
Another theory posits that politicians are self-interested and maximize 
their own return without strong regard to either the general welfare or party 
interests. In this case, districts with powerful politicians should receive 
more discretionary funds. Both Brian Knight (2005) and Gary Cox, Thad 
Kousser, and Matthew McCubbins (2010) provide empirical evidence that 
those with agenda-setting power are able to gain substantial rents. In contrast, 
Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010), using a 23-year panel of county-level dis-
bursements of federal government expenditures, find that committee leaders 
and members of important committees do not receive greater amounts of 
federal dollars per capita than other districts.
Similarly, it may be that political moderates who can credibly threaten 
to vote for either side receive more funds for their districts. The most com-
monly used model in political economy, the probabilistic voting model 
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987), captures this intuition. It shows that policy 
and rents are apportioned to individuals in rough proportion to their prob-
ability of being swing voters. Such rent accrual to ideological moderates 
has been verified in the Swedish context (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). 
7. “Obama the Management Failure,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2014 (http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303933104579302480571979884).
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In the context of ARRA, we might expect senators and representatives with 
more moderate voting records, as well as members who are seen as pivotal 
for this particular vote, to receive greater funds.
In our paper, we look at the distribution of funds both across states and 
across congressional districts, and we examine how the allocation of funds 
was related to both the economic characteristics of the local area as well 
as the political characteristics of the area’s congressional representatives. 
The geographic pattern of ARRA spending turns out to be generally incon-
sistent with most of the above predictions. When it comes to the economic 
determinants of stimulus, we find no significant correlation between the 
amount spent and the local unemployment rate, suggesting that the funds 
were not spatially targeted so as to maximize the fiscal multiplier. We do 
find, however, that congressional districts with higher percentages of the 
population under the federal poverty line received a greater amount of 
funding. Finally, we also find that congressional districts with greater 
employment-per-resident (that is, central urban and more economically 
active areas) received substantially more funding. At the same time, these 
district-level findings for poverty and employment are not replicated at 
the state level; in fact, states with higher rates of poverty received some-
what smaller amounts of funding, suggesting that the targeting to poor 
areas happened at the level of allocations within states and not across 
states. This is consistent with the ARRA budgeting process, whereby a 
certain portion of funds allocated to a state were “set aside” for particu-
lar areas or purposes.
We divide our results on political targeting into whether individuals 
were targeted and whether groups (political parties) were targeted. For 
the former, we test whether members of Congress were able to secure 
more funds for their districts by exploiting their positions of power within 
Congress, for example through formal leadership positions or through 
their status as pivotal members. For the latter, we examine whether poli-
ticians influenced the allocation of funds in order to benefit one political 
party over the other.
Individual targeting does not appear to have played a role in the allocation 
of funds. We find no evidence that powerful members of Congress were 
able to secure more funding for their districts; this includes party leaders as 
well as Democratic and Republican committee leaders. In contrast to Matz 
Dahlberg and Eva Johansson (2002), we find that ideological moderates 
were actually less likely to receive ARRA funds. We also find no evidence 
that pivotal legislators received substantially more funds. This is not sur-
prising in the House, where the bill was certain to pass due to the large 
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majority held by the Democratic party at the time. However, it is somewhat 
surprising that it was also true in the Senate, where the Democratic Party 
needed a minimum of two Republican votes to avoid a filibuster.
It is important to note that our finding that pivotal members of the Senate 
did not receive more funds is consistent with academic and popular accounts 
that pivotal members had large influence over the bill. Nolan McCarty, 
Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (2013) discuss press reports about the 
senators from Maine using their pivotal status to reduce the size of the bill 
by $200 billion and to adjust the Alternative Minimum Tax for inflation, 
while Republican Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania used his clout to 
increase funding for the National Institutes of Health. We have no way to 
test for the impact of pivotal senators on the overall composition of the bill, 
but we find no evidence that pivotal senators increased the amount of funds 
allocated to their home states. We interpret these results as showing that 
politics did not affect the geographic distribution of funds. However, this 
should not be construed as implying that the politics or political ideology 
of powerful legislators did not influence the bill.
While we see no evidence of targeting toward individual politicians, 
the evidence on group targeting (that is, partisanship) is more mixed. In 
general, our evidence supports the weak-party hypothesis. Importantly, 
neither of the two parties appears to have targeted extra funds toward mar-
ginal districts, that is, those that had close outcomes in the previous elec-
tion. Likewise, we find no significant impact of being a marginal Democrat 
versus a marginal Republican. This is an important result for two reasons. 
First, legislators working in the interests of the party might choose to target 
funds toward marginal districts, because these are the districts most vulner-
able to switching parties in the next election. Second, close Democratic 
districts and close Republican districts are likely to be similar along many 
other dimensions as well, so this comparison offers the cleanest empirical 
test of whether districts were targeted based on their explicit party affili-
ation. Our results here echo those of Albouy (2009), although in contrast 
to the literature, we focus on a single piece of legislation; nonetheless, the 
legislation we analyze is sizable, with $308 billion in highly discretion-
ary funds. Notably, Albouy (2009) finds his null results during a time of 
divided government (1980–2003) during which several presidents all had 
to bargain with Congress in order to get legislation passed, while we find 
the same null effect during a period of strong unified government. We also 
look at the state-level allocations and consider whether swing states in the 
electoral college received more money, and we find that this is not the case; 
if anything, swing states receive less funding.
Christopher Boone, ArindrAjit duBe, and ethAn KAplAn 381
At the same time, we do find some evidence suggesting that strongly 
Democratic areas received slightly higher levels of funding, although we 
are unable to determine whether this reflects targeting for partisan politi-
cal purposes or merely reflects the policy preferences of the politicians 
who wrote the bill. In our baseline sample, which excludes state capitals, 
Democratic districts in the House received, on average, only $95 more per 
capita in discretionary funding than their Republican counterparts, despite 
the fact that Democrats had large majorities in both chambers of Congress 
and held the presidency at the time of ARRA’s passage. Controlling for 
district characteristics that were relevant for some of the funding formulas, 
this differential falls to $34 per capita and is not statistically significant. 
In addition, we do not find any differential by party when we consider award 
per worker (as opposed to per resident) in the districts—with or without 
controls. We do find that strongly Democratic districts, those where the 
Democratic Party vote share is 80 to 90 percent, received more funds. How-
ever, this differential is at least partly driven by a small number of very 
dense urban districts with high levels of employment—and the differential 
is smaller when we consider the stimulus award per worker in the district. 
Thus, it may reflect dollars going where firms are located. Our results for the 
House of Representatives are echoed in the Senate: we find that states with 
more Democratic senators received more money.
Overall, when we consider the variation in spending across congressional 
districts and states, we do not find much evidence of targeting based on 
either countercyclical or political considerations. It is possible that Demo-
crats felt constrained in their ability to explicitly target districts based on 
partisan affiliation, yet they still engaged in a more subtle form of target-
ing; they may have targeted based on characteristics such as employment 
and poverty, precisely because those characteristics tend to be associated 
with Democratic districts. Another possibility is that the policy preferences 
of Democratic legislators support the types of projects that tend to be located 
in Democratic constituencies. While we can rule out more explicit measures 
of partisan targeting, we are not able to identify or distinguish between 
these more subtle and limited forms. However, the evidence generally sug-
gests that both economic and political targeting was limited.
The relative lack of political and countercyclical targeting in the most 
discretionary components of ARRA contrasts with evidence from New 
Deal legislation. Price Fishback, Shawn Kantor, and John Wallis (2003) argue 
that grants under the New Deal were targeted both to high unemployment 
areas and to swing district supporters of President Franklin Roosevelt in the 
prior presidential campaign. In section IV of this paper, where we interpret 
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our results, we consider some possible explanations for this difference. In 
particular, we argue that since the 1930s, bills have increasingly relied on 
funding formulas. In the case of ARRA, we find that the amount of money 
spent is highly correlated with employment and poverty, both of which are 
featured heavily in the formula language in the bill. Others have argued 
that these funding formulas were enacted primarily to facilitate quick dis-
bursement of funds while limiting pork. However, even funding formulas 
can be altered to benefit certain districts over others, allowing legislators to 
funnel large sums of money to their districts. Thus, we also argue that shifts 
in norms have put additional constraints on today’s bills to spread ben-
efits relatively evenly across districts. This hypothesis is borne out in our 
results, since we find that after removing from the analysis seven districts 
with large projects, funding is spread relatively evenly across districts.
Some caution is warranted when drawing general conclusions from our 
results. First, it is worth recalling that ARRA was passed by a new presi-
dent, one who had spoken out against pork and in favor of government 
transparency. Moreover, the losing candidate in the recent presidential elec-
tion had strongly advocated for abolishing earmarks (targeted geographi-
cal expenditures). Thus, from an early stage, the president had announced 
that he would not accept a bill with earmarks. Second, President Obama 
had run for office promising a post-partisan administration. Therefore, the 
White House was plausibly concerned about appearing overly partisan by 
spending money in a politically targeted way. Third, the bill was passed at 
the height of employment losses during the Great Recession, and thus there 
was a shared sense of urgency for the bill across the Democratic Party. 
Finally, the bill was all but guaranteed passage in the House, although it 
needed a few Republicans to avoid a filibuster in the Senate.
These caveats notwithstanding, we believe our study offers some general 
lessons. First, we note that it is often the case that bills are marginal in the 
Senate but assured to pass or fail in the House. This is due to the Senate’s 
filibuster rule, whose use has been increasingly common in recent years. 
Second, the urgency of the bill, though perhaps uncommon for a general 
spending bill, is probably not uncommon for a stimulus bill, since the onset 
of large recessions is usually rapid. Therefore, our study is likely to be 
relevant for understanding the political economy of fiscal stimulus. Third, 
our results are consistent with those from the burgeoning empirical political 
economy literature on distributive politics.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section I, we 
summarize how decisions were made to allocate ARRA funds. In section II, 
we describe the data that we use. In section III we present our results, and 
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in section IV we interpret the findings and discuss policy implications. 
Section V concludes.
I. How Congress Budgeted ARRA
In Congress, budget items are normally sent through fiscal committees as 
well as appropriations committees in both the House and the Senate. This 
was also true in the case of ARRA. Most of the details of the contracts, 
grants, and loans (hereafter CGL) portion of the bill were decided in the 
12 appropriations subcommittees in the House and the Senate.
Since both the Obama administration and leaders in the Republican 
Party had argued strongly against expenditures being explicitly targeted to 
particular districts, no earmarks were incorporated into the bill. Before the 
bill was passed, each of the 12 appropriations subcommittees, separately in 
both the House and the Senate, came up with proposed budgets. These bud-
gets were then reconciled across the House and the Senate and the resulting 
compromise was ultimately written into the bill. Since it was clear early on 
both that no Republican House members would vote for the bill (as none 
actually did) and that Republican votes would not be needed, Republicans 
in the House of Representatives played little role in formulating the budget. 
In the Senate, all of the Democrats who were present voted in favor of the 
bill; they were joined by two independents who caucused with the Demo-
crats: Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut and Senator Bernie Sanders 
of Vermont.8 In addition, one Democratic senator, Ben Nelson of Nebraska, 
publicly announced his ambivalence about the bill in the weeks leading up to 
the vote. The Democrats and independents were joined by three Republican 
senators: Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe, both from Maine, and Arlen 
Specter, from Pennsylvania.9 Thus, Republicans played a larger role in the 
Senate than in the House, but the bill was still predominantly formulated 
by congressional staff on the Democratic side.
The bill was crafted with strong time constraints that, combined with 
the desire to eliminate pork, led the appropriations committees to provide 
funding using pre-existing federal formulas. Some of the project money 
was allocated through competitive grants so that at least some projects were 
selected based solely on project quality. Thus, almost all of the CGL money 
was allocated using either funding formulas or competitive grants.
8. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) did not vote, due to illness, and Senator Al Franken 
(D-Minn.) was not allowed to sit for the Senate seat until the summer of 2009 due to litiga-
tion following a very close election.
9. Specter was a Republican until May 2009, when he switched to the Democratic Party.
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A hard commitment to pre-existing formulas would in theory reduce 
the rent-seeking behavior of politicians to simply bargaining for general 
increases in levels of funding through particular formulas, in lieu of par-
ticular projects for their districts or states. However, incentives to argue for 
marginal increases in formula funding are muted, because in most formulas 
an increase of one dollar in funding to a legislator’s constituents would be 
accompanied by an increase of tens of dollars to other states and an increase 
of hundreds of dollars to other districts. This point is well argued by Michael 
Grunwald (2012, p. 233) who relates the following:
The final spat on the Senate side did not pit the moderates against the leadership, 
but Specter against Ben Nelson, who wanted to tweak the Recovery Act’s formula 
for distributing Medicaid funds to get rural states extra cash. Specter said: No way. 
[Peter] Orszag did some calculations in his head, and informed Rahm [Emanuel] 
that Nelson was hijacking the entire stimulus over $25 million.
It is unclear precisely how the commitment to use historical funding 
formulas was maintained. We suggest the possibility that legislative norms 
or norms among voters can sustain this commitment and, moreover, that 
this allows for both contemporaneous improvements in avoiding wasteful 
bargaining or graft as well as increased reciprocity between legislators 
over time.
The ARRA formula money was disbursed by federal agencies and given 
to state governors. However, gubernatorial discretion was limited regard-
ing how it could be spent, where it could be spent, and how quickly it could 
be spent. For example, highway money had to be used to build and repair 
highways only, 50 percent of it had to be spent within 6 months, and all of it 
had to be spent within a year. Any money that remained unspent was to be 
redistributed to other states by the Federal Department of Transportation. 
Other portions of the bill mandated that a certain percentage of the funds 
be spent in rural or urban areas.
The competitive grant money was allocated to the executive branch 
agencies and was then allocated to recipients based on merit using criteria 
described in the bill. The criteria used by the various departments differed 
by type of grant and were written by both legislators and staffers.
Despite the pervasive use of funding formulas and competitive grants, 
there was still room for substantial political influence over the distribution 
of expenditures. The Obama administration pushed for certain projects 
that were of interest to it (including money for alternative energy, high- 
speed rail, and local public transportation). Similarly, whereas pushing for 
district-specific projects was not allowed, members of Congress could have 
influence over how much money their districts received by putting more 
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money into programs that favored their districts or states or by altering fund-
ing formulas or program criteria. For example, members of Congress from 
rural areas might have tried to push the subcommittees to increase allot-
ments to funding formulas based on highway miles, while representatives 
from urban districts might have pushed for increased funds through funding 
formulas for public transportation systems. Overall, despite the pervasive 
use of funding formulas and competitive bidding, there was indeed sub-
stantial scope for politicians to affect the geographical distribution of funds.
II. Data Description
In this section we detail the sources used in our analyses of the data.
II.A. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Our data on ARRA spending come from the website www.recovery.gov, 
which was created to provide taxpayers with information on how the ARRA 
funds were spent, as mandated by the Act itself. Spending under ARRA 
can be divided into three major categories: tax benefits; entitlements; and 
contracts, grants, and loans (CGL). For the last category, Recovery.gov 
provides information on each individual recipient, including the recipient’s 
address, along with the primary zip code and congressional district where 
the activity was to be carried out. For the tax benefits and entitlements 
categories, only state-level statistics are available. A majority of the analy-
sis in this paper is therefore focused exclusively on the CGL funds. Some 
of our state-level analysis uses aggregated data at the state level, which also 
include most of the entitlement spending.
As of January 2014, the total estimated expenditure under ARRA was 
$840 billion (an increase from the original estimate of $787 billion). Of 
this total, CGL funds accounted for around $267 billion. We aggregate the 
amount of disbursement to the House district level and, for some specifica-
tions, to the state level.
We exclude from our baseline district-level analysis all congressional 
districts containing any part of a state capital. We do this because a large 
portion of the money sent to state capital districts was disbursed to the state 
governments and subsequently redistributed across the state. For example, 
educational grants are predominantly sent to state capitals and then distrib-
uted by governors and state legislatures throughout the state. The ARRA 
data record this type of spending as going to the congressional district where 
the headquarters of the state governmental agency is located, and there-
fore the data do not accurately reflect the distribution of spending across 
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congressional districts. After dropping congressional districts containing 
any part of a state capital, we are left with 334 out of 435 congressional 
districts, implying that the average capital city is contained within two con-
gressional districts. We discuss this issue in more detail below. Overall, 
$106 billion of the $267 billion in CGL funds remains after excluding state 
capitals from the sample.
For our state-level analysis, in some specifications we aggregate the CGL 
data to the state level. For other specifications, we use aggregate state-level 
data reported by the federal agencies and available through Recovery.gov. 
These agency-reported data include contracts, grants, and loans as well as 
some of the entitlement money, such as unemployment insurance and 
Medicaid funds.
II.B. Voting and Congressional Data
We use vote returns reported in Congressional Quarterly for the Novem-
ber 2008 general election for the U.S. House of Representatives. The two-
party Democratic vote share in each congressional district is computed as 
the number of votes for the Democratic candidate divided by the total votes 
for the Democratic and Republican candidates. The median Democratic 
vote share in our sample is 57.7 percent, reflecting the Democratic majority 
in the House at the time. On February 13, 2009—the date of the vote on the 
ARRA conference report—there were 255 Democrats, 178 Republicans, 
and 2 vacant seats in the House of Representatives. We also obtain from 
Congressional Quarterly the average Democratic vote share for president 
at the state level.
Data on the tenure of each member of the House come from the Office 
of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and data on the tenure of 
senators come from Roll Call, the newspaper published by Congressional 
Quarterly. We use data from the website Govtrack.us to track committee 
assignments for the 111th Congress and each representative’s vote on 
ARRA. DW-Nominate scores for individual legislators were downloaded 
from voteview.com.
II.C. Other Data
We also use data for a number of demographic and economic charac-
teristics at the state and district levels. Data on state-level Medicaid and 
county-level unemployment insurance expenditure are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. District-level information on population, poverty, and 
land area comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. We use data on county-level 
unemployment rates from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program 
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at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. County-level information on home loans 
is from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, made available by 
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.  District-level char-
acteristics for unemployment rate, home loans, highway miles, and unem-
ployment insurance are derived from the county-level information using 
geographic correspondences provided by the Missouri Census Data Center. 
For data on total employment, we use the 2008 LEHD Origin- Destination 
Employment Statistics (LODES) data available from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and aggregate the census block-level data to the district level.10
III. Results
In this section, we present our main results. We begin by looking at how 
the ARRA money was distributed across different types of expenditures. 
In section III.B, we discuss the correlation of expenditures with economic 
variables. In section III.C, we test for targeting to the Democratic Party. 
In section III.D, we test for individual targeting of powerful political elites. 
In the final portion of the results section, we test for targeting of pivotal 
members of Congress as well as party defiers.
In each of the following sections, we separately discuss evidence from 
the Senate and the House of Representatives. On the one hand, the Sen-
ate seems a more natural place to look for the impact of politics on the 
allocation of funds, because it was in the Senate that passage of the bill was 
uncertain and a few swing legislators had the potential to influence the out-
come. It is also possible that Senate leaders who negotiated the bill were bet-
ter able to obtain political rents for their districts than House leaders were, 
since there was little need for internal bargaining in the House. A second 
advantage of looking at the Senate is that it allows us to view a larger fraction 
of the total ARRA expenditures. For example, the supplemental expenditures 
for entitlement programs, such as money for Medicaid expansion and unem-
ployment insurance, are not reported at the congressional district level. Addi-
tionally, a large portion of the CGL funds were formally allocated to state 
capitals but in practice spread across districts within the states; we thus have 
to omit these state-level program expenditures in our district-level analysis.
On the other hand, the fact that passage of the bill was assured in the 
House certainly does not rule out targeting of funds to party leaders and well-
connected members of the House. The House still needed to be bargained 
10. LODES data are not available for Massachusetts, so we instead use the ZIP Code 
Business Patterns from the U.S. Census Bureau, and derive district-level employment using 
geographic correspondences from the Missouri Census Data Center.
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with, and House leaders could have exploited their agenda-setting power. 
In addition, since ARRA was passed only by Democrats in the House, 
it is possible that partisan effects could have been much stronger across 
House districts than across states. Another important difference between 
the House and the Senate is in the number of representatives. There are 
435 House districts, 334 of which did not contain any portion of a state 
capital. Therefore, there are almost seven times as many observations when 
looking at House districts as compared to looking at the states represented 
in the Senate, and thus the House affords us a substantially larger sample 
size. Finally, since the Senate contains two members per state while the 
House contains only one member per district, we might expect stronger 
individual targeting in the Senate but stronger group targeting in the House. 
In this paper, therefore, we look at the allocation of funds across states as 
well as across congressional districts.
III.A. What Was the Money Spent On?
In this section, we give an overview of what types of projects were 
funded with the ARRA money. In online appendix figures A1 and A2, we 
display maps showing the amount of stimulus funds received, with darker 
areas indicating higher levels of funding per capita.11 Figure A1 shows per 
capita amounts at the state level, while figures A2a and A2b show amounts 
at the congressional district level. Figure A2b omits districts containing 
portions of state capitals and therefore displays the distribution of funding 
we use in our main district-level analysis. The maps reveal no immediately 
obvious patterns.
The mean amount of stimulus funds received per resident in a district in 
the form of CGL was $469 (or $900 per capita when including state capitals). 
State capitals receive substantially higher amounts per capita than non-
capital districts because capital districts receive funds for state governments, 
particularly education funds, which constituted a very large proportion of 
total funds. The mean amount of CGL funds received per resident of a state 
was $517, excluding state capitals (and $1,056 including state capitals). The 
discrepancy between states and districts reflects the fact that smaller states 
received a higher average amount of funds per resident. The mean receipt 
of funds per resident in the agency data is $1,617. This is substantially 
higher than the CGL data, because it includes money allocated to state-level 
programs such as unemployment insurance and Medicaid.
11. Online appendixes for all papers in this volume may be found at the Brookings 
Papers webpage, www.brookings.edu/bpea, under “Past Editions.”
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Table 1. descriptive statisticsa
With state capitals
Without state 
capitals
Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation
State level
CGL amountb,c 5,334 5,705 2,112 3,133
CGL amount per capita 1,056 450 517 262
Agency-reported amountc 9,444 10,685
Agency-reported amount 
per capita
1,617 429
D Unemployment rate  
Jan 07–Jan 09
2.96 1.25
Employment per residentd 45 4.11
Poverty rate (percent) 12.7 2.94
Medicaid per capitae 976 326
Interstate miles per capita 0.00029 0.00035
State population (millions) 6.13 6.8
Average Senate Democratic 
vote share (percent)
52.4 13.9
District level f
CGL amountc 613 1,213 316 370
CGL amount per capita 900 1,786 469 543
Stimulus amount per worker 1,941 3,623 1,101 1,308
Poverty rate (percent) 13.4 5.56 13.6 5.83
Percent urban 79 19.8 79.9 20.3
Land area (square miles) 0.813 3.07 0.54 1.01
Total highway miles 852 975 762 864
Employmentg 297 100 289 103
Percent spent in 1 year 32.2 9.9 31.2 9.19
House Democratic vote 
share (percent)
57.7 23.4 57.8 24.4
Tenureh 6.24 4.55 6.53 4.65
DW-Nominate score -0.0336 0.441 -0.0329 0.44
Total CGL amount $267 billion $106 billion
Total agency-reported 
amount
$472 billion
a. All financial amounts in dollars unless otherwise indicated.
b. CGL amount refers to the ARRA funds received by the state or district in the form of contracts, 
grants, and loans.
c. Dollars in millions.
d. Employment per resident is calculated as total state employment divided by state population 
times 100.
e. Medicaid per capita is based on Medicaid expenditure in 2005.
f. The district-level political variables (tenure, Democratic vote share, DW-Nominate score) refer to the 
House member representing that district.
g. In thousands of workers.
h. Number of 2-year terms.
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The descriptive statistics in table 1 show sizable variation in expenditure 
across congressional districts. The standard deviation of per capita expen-
diture is $543 per person excluding state capitals (and $1,786 per person 
including state capitals). We also report vote share information in table 1. 
Since the House of Representatives was highly Democratic at the time, the 
mean Democratic vote share was 58 percent. The vote share was identical 
for districts containing at least some portion of a state capital.
Focusing only on congressional districts outside of state capitals, we 
begin by showing a kernel density estimate of the per capita expenditure.12 
The distribution, shown in figure 1 (upper panel), is heavily skewed to 
the right. The district that received the lowest amount of money was Rep-
resentative Anthony Weiner’s (Democratic) district in New York City, 
which received around $7 per person of CGL funding. The highest amount 
received by any congressional district in our sample was around $3,750 
per person for Representative Doc Hastings’ (Republican) district, which 
includes the Tri-Cities and Yakima, Washington. This means Hastings’ dis-
trict received over 500 times more money per person than Weiner’s district. 
In the lower panel of figure 1, we show a histogram and kernel density 
estimates of the Democratic vote share. There are two modes of the distri-
bution of vote share: one Republican mode around 40 percent and another 
Democratic mode around 70 percent. There are also a few districts with 
uncontested Republican winners and almost three times as many districts 
with uncontested Democratic ones.
Although the amount of variation across congressional districts was 
substantial, the amount of variation across states was much more muted. 
However, the large amount of variation across districts is largely driven 
by a small number of outliers. To show this, we decompose the sum of the 
squares of per capita funding into the mean and residual variation:
y I y y y
i
I
i
i
I∑ ∑( )= + −
= =
.
2
1
2 2
1
We report the mean fraction of the sum of squares (or one minus the 
residual variation share of the sum of squares):
I y
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yi
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1
12. We use an Epanechnikov kernel with an optimal bandwidth minimizing mean 
squared integrable error relative to a fitted Gaussian distribution.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Sample includes the 334 districts not containing state capitals. 
b. Stimulus data include only contract, grants, and loans reported on recovery.gov. 
c. Democratic vote share is the percentage of Democratic votes out of total votes for the Democratic 
and Republican candidate in the 2008 congressional election.
50
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1,000 2,000
Dollars
Democratic vote share (percent)
3,000
Stimulus amount per residentb
Democratic vote sharec
Number of districts
Number of districts
10
20
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Figure 1. histograms of district-level stimulus Amount and democratic Vote sharea
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Overall, de-meaned cross-district variation accounts for 79.9 percent of 
the total sum of the squares of payments per resident in the CGL data. 
Thus, the mean payment to a district accounts for a mere 20.1 percent of 
the total sum of the squares.
This shows that ARRA expenditures were not distributed equally. How-
ever, when we omit state capitals, the portion attributable to the mean rises 
to 42.8 percent.
We then identify 17 outliers, using a cutoff of $1,300 per resident. Of 
these districts, 12 are Democratic districts and five are Republican districts. 
Out of the 10 districts receiving more than $2,000 per resident, five are 
Republican and five are Democratic. If we take a simple regression model 
with per capita funds on the left-hand side and only a constant term and 
Democratic dummy on the right-hand side, adding in dummies for these 
17 districts increases the R2 from 0.007 to 0.808. Moreover, we find that the 
mean share of the sum of the squares rises to 68.5 percent.
When we look at the distribution of funds on a per-worker basis, we find 
five Republican districts and two Democratic ones that get more than $3,500 
per worker. In a simple regression with amount per worker on the left-hand 
side and only a constant term and Democratic dummy on the right-hand side, 
we obtain an R2 of zero (to three significant digits). However, adding seven 
dummies for the outlier districts increases the R2 to 76.4 percent. Taking 
out these seven outlier districts increases the mean share of the sum of 
the squares from 41.6 percent to 67.7 percent, which is very similar to the 
mean share in per-resident terms after removing the 17 top outliers. The 
state-level mean shares using the CGL data are significantly higher. Includ-
ing the funds going to state capitals, the mean share is 79.9 percent. Omit-
ting state capital funds, it rises to 84.9 percent. Using the agency data, it is 
93.6 percent. This result shows that state shares of per capita expenditure 
did not vary much. We display the distribution of expenditures per resident 
as well as per worker, including the outliers, in figure 2.
The large amounts allocated to the outlier districts are due to sizable 
individual awards rather than to a large number of awards. We show these 
results in online appendix figure A3. The two top recipients among Repub-
licans, Doc Hastings (Wash.) and Buck McKeon (Calif.), represented 
districts in which the largest awards made up 22 percent and 42 percent, 
respectively, of the district’s fund allocation. In both cases, these were large 
competitive DOE grants or loans (water reclamation at the Hanford nuclear 
site and a solar energy loan, respectively). The two top recipients among 
Democratic-represented districts—the district of Elijah Cummings (Md.) and 
that of Barbara Lee (Calif.)—had 29 percent and 11 percent of their funds, 
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respectively, going to their top grant. In the case of Elijah Cummings’ dis-
trict, the funds were for the Maryland Department of Education; normally 
such funds would go to the state capital (Annapolis), but in this case they 
went to Baltimore.13 In the case of Barbara Lee’s district, the large grant 
was to the California Department of Transportation for the construction of 
a local highway tunnel.
More generally, the top ten recipients all received more than $2,000 
per recipient, and in every case a majority of the money was contained in 
the top 5 percent of grants. The top four recipients all received more than 
$3,000 per resident, and more than 80 percent of their funds were in the 
top 5 percent of awards. In general, as seen in online appendix figure A3, 
there is a strong positive correlation between the amount a district received 
and the percent of funds received in the top 5 percent of awards. This sug-
gests that outlier districts were outliers largely because they were awarded 
funding for particularly large projects, often through a competitive grant.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Dollars
20 40 60
McKeon (CA)
Lee (CA)
McCarthy (CA)
Cummings (MD)
Barrett (SC)
Wamp (TN)
Hastings (WA)
1,000
2,000
3,000
80
Democratic vote share (percent)
Stimulus amount per resident
Dollars
20 40 60 80
Democratic vote share (percent)
Stimulus amount per worker (dollars)
McKeon (CA)
Lee (CA)
McCarthy (CA)
Cummings (MD)
Barrett (SC)
Wamp (TN)
Hastings (WA)
5,000
10,000
15,000
Figure 2. district-level outliers
13. This is the only case we found where state funds went to a district that did not contain 
the state capital.
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The money in the ARRA bill was distributed through 207 different fed-
eral funding agencies. However, the top four (in funding amounts) of these 
accounted for 55 percent of the total CGL funds distributed. These four 
agencies are (in descending order): the Office of Elementary and Second-
ary Education ($64.7 billion), the Department of Energy ($38.3 billion), the 
Federal Highway Administration ($27.9 billion), and the Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitation Services ($13.6 billion). The other top ten 
granting agencies (also in descending order) were the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, the National Institutes of Health, the Federal 
Transit Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, and the Rural Utility Service. These ten agencies 
distributed 74 percent of the $267 billion in our data. The amounts for these 
top ten funding agencies are listed in online appendix table A1. The top five 
granting agencies in the data, excluding the state capitals, were the Depart-
ment of Energy, the Federal Highway Administration, the National Insti-
tutes of Health, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (online appendix table A2).
III.B. Economic Targeting
Given the legislation’s stated countercyclical objective, we now con-
sider whether financial need or high excess capacity was predictive of 
how much funding a district received. In online appendix figure A4, we 
nonparametrically regress the amount received per resident on our two 
measures of excess capacity. In the left panel we measure excess capac-
ity using the unemployment rate, and in the right panel we measure it using 
the change in the unemployment rate between January 2007 and Janu-
ary 2009. In both cases, we see that districts with higher unemployment 
received slightly less funding per district resident. These results reinforce 
similar findings by Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe (2013) and Inman (2010). 
In the district-level regressions in table 2, we report coefficients on seven 
different variables for five specifications each, reflecting results from 
35 different regressions in all. A constant term and (in some specifications) 
additional covariates are included in these regressions, but only the coef-
ficient on the variable of interest is displayed. The top three rows report 
the results from regressions using CGL funds per district resident, and the 
bottom two rows report results using CGL funds per worker. We look at 
per-worker specifications because we do find that, in contrast to the cross-
state variation, more money went to highly urbanized areas that were 
centers of employment. Much of the formula money given to the states 
stipulated that a certain percentage of the funds be spent in urban areas, so 
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it is not surprising that the large-recipient districts were located in urban 
areas. At the same time, the districts that received the least amount of fund-
ing were also located in urban areas. Interestingly, the amount of funds 
received per resident is much more strongly correlated with employment 
in a district than with the percent of the district that is urban. Within large 
urban areas, there is substantial variation in employment levels across con-
gressional districts.
Most people who work in Wyoming’s congressional district also 
live in it. By contrast, a much lower percentage of people who work 
in the congressional districts in Manhattan also live there. Neighboring 
Brooklyn and Queens are much more places of consumption than produc-
tion in comparison with both Manhattan and Wyoming. More CGL funds 
went to places like Manhattan with high levels of economic activity by 
firms or other recipient organizations than to places like Wyoming. Places 
like Wyoming, in turn, received more CGL funds than urban consumption 
centers like Brooklyn and Queens. This, in part, explains the low amounts 
of funding received by Representative Anthony Weiner’s district (in Queens 
and Brooklyn). In the first and fourth rows of table 2, we show per resident 
and per worker results without any additional controls. In the second row 
we control for 2008 employment, the poverty rate, highway miles, and per-
cent urban as well as nine vote-share bin dummies for the vote share of the 
congressional representative in the district. The results including all these 
covariates are generally statistically similar to the unconditional results. 
In the third row, we also control for land area. In some specifications, this 
leads to different results. All of these covariates represent variables that 
were explicitly or effectively incorporated into funding formulas. Finally, 
in the fifth row, we report the per-worker variant of the third row (omitting 
employment as a control).14
We find no statistically significant correlation in any of the specifica-
tions between amount per capita and either of our measures of unemploy-
ment or the per-resident amount of unemployment insurance spent in the 
district. We also find no statistically significant correlation with percent 
urban in any of the specifications. We do find very strong positive correla-
tions between employment in a district and amounts per resident. The esti-
mates are very tightly estimated. Districts with 100,000 more workers on 
average get $200 more per resident. In all three per-resident specifications, 
the t statistics are above 5 and the point estimates vary by less than 0.06 across 
specifications. Moreover, employment is not only highly correlated with 
14. The coefficients on our additional controls are reported in online appendix table A3.
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funding, it is quantitatively important for explaining overall variation. 
Adding just employment increases the R2 by almost 14 percentage 
points. No other variable in our district-level regressions has such 
large explanatory power. Also, adding in other controls does not change 
the marginal R2 of adding in employment. The estimates are surprisingly 
invariant to controlling for percent urban. This is because urban areas have 
both places with very low employment per resident ratios, such as most 
residential districts in Brooklyn, as well as places with very high employ-
ment per resident ratios, such as the business districts in Manhattan. As a 
result, urbanness in itself is not highly correlated with employment per 
resident, nor is employment correlated with amount received per worker 
in the district.
The second most important of our covariates is poverty. Poor districts 
received more money. Adding in poverty increases the R2 by approximately 
0.03. Again, this is not surprising, given that some of the formula money 
set aside portions specifically for historically poor areas.15 Nevertheless, 
the results on poverty are less robust than those on employment. Adding in 
our other controls lowers the coefficient estimates slightly but also almost 
doubles the standard errors. Unconditionally, places with a 1-percentage-
point higher poverty rate received $16 more in funds per resident and 
$42 more per worker. Since between one-third and one-half of the residents 
in a district work,16 the per-worker coefficients are usually two to three 
times as high. Unconditionally, both coefficients are significant at the 1 per-
cent level. With the full set of controls, the t statistics in the per-resident 
specification are just below significance at the 10 percent level with a t 
statistic of 1.57, and the per-worker coefficient is significant between the 
10 percent and the 5 percent level with a t statistic of 1.87.
One possible explanation for the lack of targeting to areas with high unem-
ployment could be that ARRA was instead targeted to shovel-ready projects, 
and places with more shovel-ready projects could have been places with 
lower unemployment (or lower increases in unemployment). The Obama 
administration said that shovel-ready projects would be made a high prior-
ity, and this was reflected in the bill. Much of the formula grants stipulated 
that money would have to be returned if not spent quickly enough. While 
it is difficult to measure shovel-readiness using an ex-ante measure, we do 
have recipient-reported information on the pace at which the funds were 
15. For example, some of the money disbursed by the Department of Labor used defini-
tions of poor areas defined in a bill in 1965.
16. Note that this ratio is different from the employment-to-population ratio as usually 
defined in that it includes the elderly and children.
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disbursed and spent. To assess shovel-readiness, we construct measures of 
what fraction of the funds in a district were disbursed to projects that were 
completed within one year. Using this measure, we show (in online appen-
dix figure A5) that places that were allocated more money were on average 
somewhat slower in completing projects. This is possibly because districts 
that received more money received money for large infrastructure projects, 
and these on average took longer. Nonetheless, as online appendix fig-
ure A5 shows uniformly, places that received more money did not complete 
their projects more quickly. And across all specifications in table 2, the coef-
ficient on percent completed within one year is negative and significant at 
the 5 percent level or less. Moreover, in unreported regressions, we note that 
controlling for percent of funds spent within one year does not impact 
the coefficients on unemployment. In sum, though shovel-readiness may 
have played a role in the selection of projects, we find no evidence that it 
influenced how money was allocated across congressional districts.
We now consider the state-level results on economic targeting dis-
played in table 3. We show the coefficient estimates for the change in the 
unemployment rate between January 2009 and January 2007; in the speci-
fications with controls, we include the ratio of state employment to state 
total population, the poverty rate, Medicaid expenditures per capita, inter-
state highway miles, and the average Democratic vote share for the two 
senators serving terms in 2009. The specification is rather sparse because 
of the limited degrees of freedom with only 50 observations. This obvi-
ously also limits our ability to interpret our results. We show results for 
four different specifications: the agency data without controls, the agency 
data with controls, the CGL data including funds sent to state capitals, and 
the CGL data removing the funds that went to state capitals. We include 
controls in both of our CGL specifications. Even without controls, the 
change in the unemployment rate only adds 0.015 percentage point to the 
R2. In contrast, adding our other five controls raises the R2 to 0.436. In 
none of the specifications does the coefficient on change in unemployment 
come close to statistical significance at conventional levels. The results 
using the agency data are particularly surprising, since those data include 
the federal provisions for state unemployment insurance programs and 
aid to state Medicaid programs that was explicitly targeted to states with 
above-median unemployment rates.17
17. When we examine only the funding distributed by the Department of Labor, which 
was largely for unemployment insurance, we unsurprisingly find that areas with higher 
unemployment received more money.
400 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring 2014
In contrast to the district-level findings, employment18 and poverty 
come in negative and statistically significant in most specifications. One 
exception is that state employment has a positive sign and is significant 
at the 10 percent level in the agency data specification without controls. 
The employment numbers are small. Increasing the workforce in a state 
Table 3. state-level economic targeting (regressions)a
Change in 
unemploymentb
State 
employment c
Percent 
poverty
Panel a. Amount per resident: Agency-reported
No controls -42.60 18.31* -48.28*
(40.38) (10.49) (25.20)
R2 0.015 0.031 0.110
No. of observations 50 50 50
Panel b. Amount per resident: Agency-reported
With controlsd -7.591 -30.79 -66.69*
(65.92) (20.68) (37.15)
R2 0.436 0.436 0.436
No. of observations 50 50 50
Panel c. Amount per resident: Contracts, grants, loans
With controlsd -18.45 -41.32** -49.55**
(42.83) (18.91) (22.54)
R2 0.683 0.681 0.681
No. of observations 50 50 50
Panel d. Amount per resident: Contracts, grants, loanse
With controlsd -88.73 -57.58** -88.80*
(no capitals) (56.59) (25.96) (46.75)
R2 0.379 0.284 0.284
No. of observations 37 37 37
a. The dependent variable is stimulus amount per state resident, using the agency-reported data from 
recovery.gov for panels (a) and (b) contracts, grants, and loans data for panels (c) and (d). Each cell 
reports the coefficient from a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical sig-
nificance at the *10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent level.
b. The change in unemployment is the difference between the unemployment rates in January 2009 
and January 2007.
c. State employment refers to the total employment in the state divided by state population, multiplied 
by 100.
d. “Controls” include medicaid expenditures per capita, interstate highway miles, the poverty rate, 
employment per state resident, and the average of the two-party Democratic vote share in the prior elec-
tion for each of the two senators.
e. Panel (d) omits the funds allocated to state capital districts.
18. In contrast to the district level, where we include employment, here we include the 
employment-to-population ratio in the state. Whereas population does not vary substantially 
across congressional districts, it does vary across states and we account for that by dividing 
employment by state population.
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by 10 percent of a state’s population is correlated with a reduction in fund-
ing equal to slightly less than $9 per person in our specification with the 
largest coefficient. The coefficients on poverty are sizable, negative, and 
statistically significant in all four specifications. Although poor areas and 
high employment areas were targeted within states through money set 
aside for poor areas and centers of employment, states with higher pov-
erty rates and states with higher employment did not receive more money. 
Echoing Inman (2010), we find that the single most important explanatory 
variable in adding to the explained share of total variation is precrisis 
Medicaid expenditures per capita, which was explicitly incorporated into 
a Medicaid funding formula.
III.C. Group Targeting: Partisanship
We next investigate whether members of Congress acted in the inter-
ests of their parties. At the time ARRA was passed, Democrats held a 
strong majority in both the House and the Senate and they also held the 
presidency. Therefore, they were able to pass the legislation without any 
support from Republicans in the House. They also passed the bill in the 
Senate, overcoming a potential Republican filibuster, with the help of only 
three Republicans. Did the Democrats therefore capture a large majority 
of the funds for their own districts, as might be expected from simple and 
standard political economy models?
As Veronique De Rugy (2010) has shown, districts represented by 
Democrats received substantially larger sums of ARRA money than those 
represented by Republicans. In our database of contracts, grants, and loans, 
districts represented by Democrats received 55 percent more than those 
represented by Republicans. In table 4, we display the results from 
regressing the district-level amount on a dummy for Democratic mem-
ber of the House. From column 1, we can see that the mean amount per 
person received in Republican districts was $684, whereas in Democratic 
districts it was $1,057. However, as we pointed out earlier, state capitals 
received funds that, while nominally allocated to the capital, were in turn 
allocated across the state.19 Education funds were generally allocated in 
this manner. The top 17 recipient districts are all part of state capitals, 
and 26 of the top 30 are state capital districts as well. The probability of 
either of these events occurring by chance is below 1 in 1013 (10 to the 
13th power).
19. In addition to Silver (2010), who discusses the state capitals problem, Albouy (2009) 
also refers to the problem as part of his justification for running state-level regressions.
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However, the pattern of funds allocations is slightly more nuanced than 
in Nate Silver’s (2010) account. Silver argues that state capitals tend to 
be heavily Democratic and therefore that these transfers to state agencies 
are more likely to be counted as going to Democratic districts. In fact, state 
capital districts have almost the same Democratic vote share on average as 
districts not located in state capitals. In table 1, we show that the Demo-
cratic vote share for the House seat is 58 percent whether or not we include 
the 101 districts that contain portions of a state capital.20 While urban areas 
tend to vote more Democratic than others, there are many districts contain-
ing portions of state capitals and the surrounding suburban land or even 
surrounding rural land. For example, the entire state of Wyoming is one 
district. Republican districts containing state capitals are slightly larger and 
less dense than Democratic ones. More importantly, state capital districts 
in larger states do tend to be more Democratic than average, while capital 
districts in smaller states tend to be more Republican. The state capitals 
in the largest states received disproportionately larger sums because most 
of the education and Medicaid spending for the entire state is given to the 
capital, and states with large populations received more total education 
and Medicaid funds. The districts of the top 10 recipients are, in descend-
ing order, the capitals of California, New York, Illinois, Florida, Texas, 
Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Only two of 
the top 17 districts, and four of the top 26 districts, were represented by a 
Republican member of the House of Representatives.
As explained earlier, since we do not know how the funds nominally allo-
cated to state capitals were actually disbursed within the states, we exclude 
all districts that include state capitals from our district-level analysis. This 
also eliminates from our sample 13 states that do not have a congressional 
district without some part of a state capital. In our revised sample, the parti-
san gap is substantially lower, with Democratic districts receiving 23 percent 
more than Republican districts. The average Republican district receives 
$416 per capita as compared to $510 per capita in the average Democratic 
district; this $95 differential is statistically significant (see column 2 of 
table 4). However, once we introduce the percent living in poverty as a 
control, the differential shrinks to a statistically insignificant $19.
We then add additional controls. None of the controls changes the 
coefficient on the Democrat dummy by much, with the exception of the 
20. Our set of capital districts differs slightly from Silver’s. We identify 101 congressio-
nal districts containing some portion of a state capital city or its surrounding county. Silver 
defines 78 districts as containing all or part of a state’s capital city.
404 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring 2014
poverty variable. Column 5 of table 4 shows that, conditional on the four 
other funding formula controls, including employment but excluding pov-
erty, the coefficient rises slightly to $109 and remains significant at a 
5 percent level. However, reintroducing poverty reduces the coefficient 
back to $33 and makes it insignificant at conventional levels. In the per-
worker regressions, reported in columns 7 and 8, the Democrat dummy is 
insignificant and small with or without controls. In fact, conditional upon 
controls, the coefficient on the Democrat dummy is -$85. Ultimately, it 
is not clear whether Democrats funneled money to their districts through 
funding formulas that targeted high poverty areas and high employment 
areas or whether these areas received more because politicians were try-
ing to create jobs in poor areas and centers of employment. Nonetheless, it 
seems unlikely that poor areas benefited from explicit targeting of Demo-
cratic areas. In fact, the poverty variable is slightly more strongly corre-
lated with funds per resident in Republican areas than in Democratic ones.
We now look more closely at the amount received by congressional 
districts as a function of the House two-party Democratic vote share, as 
illustrated in the four panels of figure 3. The upper-left panel plots the 
CGL funds per resident against the Democratic vote share. Five Republican 
outliers who received substantially larger amounts stand out, and roughly 
triple the number of Democrats also stand out. The lower-left panel shows 
that the Democratic outliers are all in districts that are 100 percent or very 
close to 100 percent urban. Thus, it is not surprising that in the upper-right 
panel we see only two Democratic outliers, although we still see the same 
five Republican outliers. In the lower-right panel we display the results of 
a nonparametric regression of the worker-per-resident ratio on vote share. 
Interestingly, we find a similar hump for districts with 80 to 90 percent 
Democratic vote share. This suggests that much of the hump in funding 
for Democrats in the 80 to 90 percent range is attributable to those districts 
being centers of employment.
In the scatter plots in figure 3, we can see that Democrats receiving 
between 80 and 90 percent of the vote share seem to have received a higher 
amount of funds per capita. To assess this further, we non-parametrically 
regress the per capita amount of CGL funds on the Democratic Party vote 
share and show the results in the upper panel of figure 4.21 We also use a semi-
parametric partial linear model to regress the per capita CGL funds on the 
21. We use the Stata command lpoly, using a “rule of thumb” plug-in bandwidth that 
minimizes the conditional weighted-mean integrated square error. Standard errors are 
obtained by bootstrapping with 100 replications.
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Democratic Party vote share, controlling parametrically for our five fund-
ing formula controls: percent living in poverty, percent living in an urban 
area, land area, road miles, and employment (lower panel). We estimate:22
A f v Xi i t( )= + β + ε ,
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. “Amount per resident” refers to people living in the congressional district.
b. For the scatter plots, each dot represents one of the 334 districts not containing state capitals. 
c. “Amount per worker” refers to all people employed within the congressional district, though they 
may reside elsewhere. 
d. Panel displays the results of a non-parametric regression of the worker-to-resident ratio on the 
Democratic vote share. 
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Figure 3. district-level stimulus Amount per resident and Amount per Worker
22. Due to concerns that very urban districts got substantially more money and are also 
highly Democratic, we ran specifications controlling for a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one for districts with 100 percent of their area in urban land. We also tried control-
ling for a dummy that takes on a value of one if a district has 90 percent or more of its land 
in urban areas. Our results are highly robust to these alternative specifications.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Results of a non-parametric regression (using kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing) of 
stimulus amount per resident on Democratic vote share. 
b. Results of a semi-parametric regression that includes (parametric) controls for employment, poverty 
rate, percent urban, land area, and road miles. Sample includes 334 congressional districts not located in 
state capitals. 
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Figure 4. district-level non-parametric and semi-parametric regressions of stimulus 
Amount per Resident on democratic Vote share
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where Ai is the per capita amount of ARRA funding received in district i, 
X is the set of demographic and economic controls, and f (vi) is a non-
parametric function of the two-party Democratic vote share.23 The results 
are shown in the right-hand panel of figure 4.
The upper panel of figure 4 confirms the evidence found in the  simple 
scatter plot showing that strongly Democratic districts with around 
80 percent of the vote share receive well above the mean amount of 
CGL funds. The lower panel of figure 4 shows that this relationship con-
tinues to hold after we account for covariates. The upper panel also sug-
gests that highly Republican districts get a modest amount more than the 
average recipient, although this difference is not statistically significant 
and does not survive the inclusion of covariates as shown in the lower 
panel.
Figure 5 shows the same results, with amount per worker as the left-
hand side variable. In the upper panel of figure 5, we see that whereas 
Democrats in the 80 to 90 percent vote share range do not get as much 
more as in the per-resident figure, they still do get more than Democrats in 
less safe districts. However, highly Republican districts also now get sub-
stantial amounts. The bootstrapped confidence intervals are much wider for 
the very Republican districts, because they are driven by one outlier that 
received a substantial amount. Putting in our five controls also increases 
the amount received per capita for marginal Republican districts, though 
not for marginal Democratic ones.
Interestingly, in table 5, when we compare closely elected Democrats 
to closely elected Republicans, we find that their districts receive about 
the same amount. If anything, the marginal Democratic districts obtained 
less in CGL funds, since the coefficient on the difference between mar-
ginal Democrats and the reference group of marginal Republicans is 
negative in four out of five specifications. However, it is never statis-
tically significant. Democratic and Republican districts with around 
50 percent Democratic vote share are likely to be similar in terms of 
other characteristics, so comparing these districts offers another way to 
test whether the partisan representation of the district affects the spend-
ing allocation.
23. We use the Yatchew method to difference out the parametric component X, and use 
local polynomial regression (Stata command lpoly) to estimate the f(vi) component non-
parametrically; the bandwidth selection is based on the “rule of thumb” plug-in method. 
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping with 100 replications.
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Regression methods correspond to those described under figure 4, except that the dependent variable 
in these panels is amount per worker, and in the lower panel employment is not included in the set of 
controls.
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Figure 5. district-level non-parametric and semi-parametric regressions of stimulus 
Amount per Worker on democratic Vote sharea
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By contrast, the point estimates for Democratic districts with between 
80 and 90 percent vote share are large in all specifications and statistically 
significant at a 5 percent or lower level in four out of five specifications. 
The effects in per-worker terms are smaller in magnitude, even after adjust-
ing for the fact that there are two to three residents per worker in an average 
district. This is consistent with the number of Democratic outliers being 
much smaller in per-worker terms than in per-resident terms. These results 
lend support to the argument that the higher average level of spending in 
Democratic districts is driven more by district characteristics than by party 
affiliation per se. However, the fact that a substantially larger amount of 
Table 5. district-level Group targeting: Vote share Blocks (regressions)a
Vote share block (and 
other variables)b
Per resident Per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unopposed  
Republican (13)
161.5
(130.9)
242.1**
(115.7)
123.8
(106.5)
437.9
(278.7)
150.7
(290.3)
Democratic vote share 
1–30 percent (16)
70.13
(133.8)
147.9
(124.8)
-95.42
(174.0)
77.35
(343.1)
-579.6
(537.4)
Democratic vote share 
30–40 percent (63)
-6.304
(100.3)
60.67
(105.8)
26.38
(91.28)
-31.88
(321.4)
-117.2
(287.7)
Democratic vote share 
50–60 percent (42)
-32.82
(66.14)
13.01
(89.64)
-56.16
(87.81)
-138.5
(285.7)
-330.1
(298.4)
Democratic vote share 
60–70 percent (44)
12.87
(67.85)
86.87
(75.33)
15.65
(71.92)
-39.66
(263.1)
-228.8
(254.6)
Democratic vote share 
70–80 percent (51)
105.4**
(40.03)
146.4***
(47.52)
100.1
(64.82)
34.42
(219.4)
-101.7
(235.6)
Democratic vote share 
80–90 percent (20)
792.9***
(144.0)
685.3***
(147.3)
603.7***
(189.1)
837.3**
(390.6)
658.6
(460.0)
Democratic vote share 
90–99 percent (5)
-21.47
(188.0)
261.3*
(135.5)
106.6
(206.7)
405.7
(395.0)
-100.5
(551.4)
Unopposed  
Democrat (34)
47.45
(103.5)
125.2
(115.0)
51.49
(139.3)
-16.47
(353.5)
-215.5
(374.0)
Employment  
(thousands)
1.741***
(0.334)
2.019***
(0.315)
R2 0.121 0.220 0.277 0.031 0.101
No. of observations 334 334 334 334 334
Additional controlsc X X
a. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is stimulus receipts per district resident; the dependent 
variable in columns (4) and (5) is stimulus receipts per worker (that is, per person employed in the dis-
trict). Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the state level. Statistical signifi-
cance indicated at the *10 percent, **5 percent, and ***1 percent level.
b. The vote share blocks are dummy variables that equal 1 if the Democratic vote share for that repre-
sentative falls in the specified range. The number of representatives in each group is indicated in parenthe-
ses. The omitted category is 40%–50% Democratic vote share; there are 46 representatives in this group.
c. “Additional controls” include poverty rate, percent urban, land area, and road miles.
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CGL funds went to districts where Democrats received between 80 and 
90 percent of the vote share suggests that there may be a partisan gap in 
funds, or some other factor that may be different in these districts.
At the state level, in table 6 we look at the correlation between ARRA 
receipts and the party of the state’s governor, a dummy variable for 
states that supported Obama by a 2-percentage-point vote margin or less, 
a variable with the number of Democratic senators in the state, and the 
Democratic vote share in the previous Senate elections averaged over both 
senators in each state. We find no evidence that Democratic governors 
received a greater amount of funds,24 nor do we find evidence that swing 
states—those that marginally supported Obama in the 2008 election—
benefited. If anything, swing states (Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina) 
received less than other states; in two of our four state-level specifications, 
the coefficients are statistically significant at a 5 percent level and of mod-
erate to large size. The results are not robust, because the coefficient size is 
much smaller when controlling for funding formula covariates and when 
we include the money reported as accruing to state capitals. Regardless, 
swing state supporters of the president certainly did not benefit in ARRA.
Our partisanship results for the Senate are similar to our district-level 
results for the House, in the sense that highly Democratic areas receive 
slightly more funds on average. Using the agency data, the coefficient on 
the number of Democratic senators is $186 per resident without controls 
and $130 per resident with controls. The estimated coefficient is roughly 
half the size using the CGL data on the full sample of states (table 6, third 
row), and it is virtually zero after stripping out the state capitals (fourth 
row). We find a similar pattern of results when considering the average 
Democratic vote share of the two senators. The unconditional correlation 
in table 6 (first row) suggests that a 10 percent increase in the Democratic 
vote share of both senators increases ARRA funding by about $100 per 
capita. (Recall that the average level of funding in the agency-reported 
data is about $1,600 per capita.) The difference between the agency data 
results and the CGL results partially reflects the fact that agency data con-
tain 60 percent more of the ARRA bill expenditures than the CGL data do. 
However, the difference also reflects the fact that states with more gen-
erous welfare programs received more funds, and these states tend to be 
24. Democratic governorship at the time of passage of ARRA has been used as an instru-
ment for stimulus (Conley and Dupor 2013). However, we find that the Democratic gover-
norship dummy has a low marginal R2, is not statistically significant, and oscillates in sign 
depending upon covariates.
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Table 6. state-level Group targeting: partisanship (regressions)a
Democratic 
governor
Obama  
50–52 percentb
No. of  
Democratic 
senatorsc
Senate 
Democratic 
vote shared
Panel a. Amount per resident: Agency-reported
No controls 43.78 -239.2*** 185.8*** 10.41***
(120.7) (76.71) (62.13) (3.739)
R2 0.003 0.018 0.136 0.115
No. of observations 50 50 49 50
Panel b. Amount per resident: Agency-reported
With controlse 14.86 -101.1 129.9*** 8.765***
(103.0) (84.47) (43.97) (2.966)
R2 0.367 0.370 0.424 0.436
No. of observations 50 50 49 50
Panel c. Amount per resident: Contracts, grants, loans
With controlse -134.9 -175.5* 69.82 6.902**
(82.55) (89.56) (47.63) (3.157)
R2 0.664 0.651 0.655 0.681
No. of observations 50 50 49 50
Panel d. Amount per resident: Contracts, grants, loans
With controlse 96.18 -233.2*** 0.253 -0.232
(no state capitals) (70.38) (80.80) (49.94) (2.857)
R2 0.312 0.340 0.281 0.284
No. of observations 37 37 36 37
a. The dependent variable is stimulus amount per state resident, using the agency-reported data from 
recovery.gov for panels (a) and (b), and the contracts, grants, and loans data for panels (c) and (d). 
Panel (d) omits the funds allocated to state capital districts. Each cell reports the coefficient from 
a separate regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated at the 
*10 percent, **5 percent, and ***1 percent level.
b. A dummy variable indicating whether 2008 presidential vote share fell in that range.
c. Number of Democratic or independent senators for a given state (a value of 0, 1, or 2); Minnesota is 
omitted from the specification since one Senate seat was vacant at the time.
d. Average of the two-party Democratic vote share in the prior election for each of the two senators.
e. “Controls” include Medicaid expenditures per capita, interstate highway miles, the poverty rate, and 
employment per state resident.
more Democratic.25 The fact that the Senate relied on Republicans in the 
ARRA vote, whereas the House did not, does not seem to have affected 
the degree to which Democratic districts benefited relative to Democratic 
states. Finally, we show in online appendix figure A6 a plot of the state-
level amount per resident on presidential vote share, using both the agency 
25. Recall that unemployment insurance and Medicaid funds are included in the agency-
reported data but not in the CGL data.
412 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring 2014
data and the CGL data. There is a clear positive relationship in the agency 
data but no relationship in the CGL data.
Overall, we find that Democratic districts did get a modest amount more 
per resident than Republican districts. However, much of the differential is 
attributable to differential poverty rates and employment concentrations in 
Democratic areas at the district level and to differences in the generosity of 
welfare programs at the state level. It is not clear whether Democratic dis-
tricts and states received more on average than Republican districts because 
the bill targeted Democratic Party priorities, such as poverty reduction, or 
whether those areas received more funds because they were Democratic.
III.D. Individual Targeting: Party Elites
Did Congressional legislators use their individual positions of power to 
their own benefit? We break down per capita ARRA funds by whether state 
and district representatives and senators had leadership positions in Con-
gress, whether they were legislative swing voters, and how long they had 
been members in Congress. Our findings are predominantly negative; that 
is, powerful politicians don’t appear to have received more funds.
The Democratic leadership in the House, including committee chairs 
and party leaders, did not receive more CGL funds for their districts than 
average. Out of twenty Democratic leaders in our sample, only two were in 
the top 10 percent of recipient districts. The top recipient in the Democratic 
Party leadership was the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. Her district, 
in San Francisco, received the 11th largest amount of funds of the 334 rep-
resentatives in our sample. The second largest recipient amount within the 
Democratic leadership went to Patrick Murphy’s district in Pennsylvania, 
which includes Levittown and surrounding areas; it received the 28th high-
est amount overall.
In table 7, we regress amount per resident and per worker on dummies 
for the Democratic leadership and for the Republican leadership separately. 
For Republican leaders, in addition to the party leadership, we include the 
ranking members of committees. We do this both with and without our 
baseline controls. We show that Democratic congressional leaders on aver-
age received the same or lower amounts than other members of Congress. 
The coefficient on the Democratic leadership is not statistically significant 
in any of the specifications; it is zero in the per-resident specification with-
out controls and negative in all others.
In online appendix table A4, we report the dummies, separating 
out the Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi) on the Democratic side and 
the Minority Leader (John Boehner) on the Republican side. Pelosi is an 
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outlier, and the speaker dummy is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in all specifications except the per-worker specification with controls. 
In the per-resident specification with controls, Pelosi received almost 
$600 more per resident than other similar members. Conditional on the 
speaker dummy, the rest of the Democratic leadership received signifi-
cantly (at the 5 percent level) less when the regression controls for funding 
formula amounts, in both the per-worker and the per-resident ($125 less) 
specifications. On the other hand, returning to table 7, we see that in all 
specifications, the Republican leadership received more than average. With 
controls, the amounts are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
However, the minority leader on the Republican side is also an outlier. His 
district received $335 less per resident, unconditionally, and $151 less con-
ditional upon controls. Although Boehner’s district ranked in the 11th per-
centile in overall fund distribution, the Boehner results are significant at the 
1 percent level without controls, suggesting that these estimates are plagued 
by small sample sizes and skewed data. After accounting for Boehner, the 
rest of the Republican leadership gets $409 more on average, conditional 
upon controls, and this is significant at the 10 percent level. Again however 
we note that these results are driven by two outliers: Representative Buck 
McKeon and Representative Doc Hastings, whose districts received $3,319 
more per resident, on average. Taking out these two outliers, we do not 
find evidence that the rest of the Republican leadership received more than 
other congressional members (see online appendix table A4).
Because of the small numbers of party leaders and the skewness of the 
distribution of funding, we also carry out small sample tests to assess 
whether these individuals received a disproportionate amount of CGL 
funds. Intuitively, by comparing those seated when the ARRA bill 
was passed (the 111th Congress) to those seated in both the following 
and prior sessions of Congress, we can estimate the impact of being in 
power precisely when the ARRA bill passed. We match the districts of cur-
rent congressional leaders in the 111th Congress to the districts of their pre-
decessors who held the same positions in the 110th Congress. There were 
six Republican leaders whom we could match, due to a number of exits of 
Republicans in the leadership of the 110th Congress. In five out of those 
six cases, the district with a leader in power during the ARRA vote received 
more money. This would happen by random chance only 4 percent of 
the time (using a one-sided test). We also look at leadership changes 
between the 111th and 112th Congress. For Republicans, this raises our 
sample size to 10. We find that in seven out of those 10 cases, the district 
with a leader in power during the ARRA vote received more, which would 
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happen by random chance with a probability of 8.9 percent. We run the 
same comparison for Democratic leaders as well. In the case of Democrats, 
there is no evidence that committee chairs received more money; in only 
five out of 11 cases did the leader in power during the ARRA vote get more. 
These results are reported in online appendix table A5.
It is more difficult to analyze the impact of committee chair positions 
in the Senate. Thirty-two states have senators who were either committee 
chairs or ranking members at the time of the ARRA vote. When we run 
a state-level regression of the amount of stimulus funds on a dummy for 
a state with a committee chair or ranking minority member, we find the 
coefficient to be negative in all four of our usual specifications. These 
coefficients, however, are not statistically significant in any specification. 
We also note that Inman (2010) finds in his regressions that the states with 
committee chairs or ranking members on the powerful fiscal-related Sen-
ate committees received a statistically insignificantly lower amount than 
other states.
Overall, then, we find no evidence that states with powerful senators or 
House members received more ARRA funds.
Legislative tenure can be thought of as a proxy for influential social 
or collegial relationships with other legislators or for institutional knowl-
edge of the functioning of Congress. For this reason, it is possible that 
longer-tenured legislators are able to procure a greater amount of funds. 
In table 7, the third row shows that tenure is positively correlated with 
both the amount received per resident and the amount received per worker. 
Both are significant at the 10 percent level. However, the upper-right panel 
of figure 6 shows that many of the longer-tenured (shaded more heavily) 
observations are in the 80 to 90 percent range. Conditional upon baseline 
controls, coefficients drop by a half to two-thirds. An additional two-year 
congressional session is associated with $2.50 more in funds per resident 
and is not statistically significant at conventional levels. We show, in online 
appendix figure A7, non-parametric and semi-parametric regressions of 
the amount received per capita on tenure, broken down as well by party. 
Among Republicans, we can see that very long-tenured individuals 
actually receive less, and among Democrats, the increases in funding with 
increased tenure are solely due to a few outliers, members who have more 
than 50 years in the House.
We show similar results in the Senate in the second column of table 9. 
Here the results are even starker than in the House. All of the coefficients 
on years in the Senate are small and none are statistically significant at con-
ventional levels. In the third column, we show that average congressional 
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tenure26 in the state is positively correlated with the amount received 
when we use the agency data, likely reflecting longer tenure for states 
with more generous welfare programs. Conditional upon controls, the size 
of the coefficient drops from $15 per resident per year of tenure to below 
$10 per resident per year. In the CGL data, we find no significant correla-
tion, and the coefficient sign turns negative with controls.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Each dot represents one of the 334 districts not containing state capitals. 
b. Percentage of the district population living in urban areas. 
c. “Tenure” refers to the number of terms served by the congressional representative. 
d. “Leadership” refers to party leaders and committee chairs (for Democrats) or ranking members (for 
Republicans) in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
2,000
3,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
1,000
Dollars per resident
Democratic vote share (percent)
By percent urbanb
By party leadershipd By ARRA vote
By tenurec
Dollars per worker
Democratic vote share (percent)
Democratic vote share (percent)Democratic vote share (percent)
Dollars per resident Ratio of workers to residents
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
0%−90% urban
90%−99% urban
99%−100% urban
Newest members
Longest-tenured members
20 40 60 80
Republican leader
Democrat leader
20 40 60 80
Republican voting Yes or abstaining
Democrat voting No or abstaining
Figure 6. district-level stimulus Amount per residenta
26. We define average congressional tenure to be the average number of years of tenure 
in the House plus the average years of tenure in the Senate, divided by two.
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Overall, we find little evidence that socially connected legislators or 
legislators in positions of power were able to grab more funds.
III.E.  Individual Targeting: Pivotal Members of Congress  
and Party Discipline
Legislators can also use their individual power to gain political rents by 
claiming to be undecided. Since legislators in the middle of the ideological 
distribution can more credibly claim to be undecided and thus to need “per-
suading” in terms of rents for their district, we look at how the ideology of 
members of Congress correlates with per capita receipts of ARRA funding. 
We use the first dimension of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s (2006) 
DW-Nominate, which is the most commonly used measure of congressio-
nal ideology. In the modern era, more than 85 percent of legislative voting 
behavior can be explained by the first dimension alone.
We are interested in how ideology correlates with funding for two rea-
sons. First, theories of congressional politics suggest that moderate politi-
cians may be able to capture larger amounts of rents because they are swing 
voters on bills and thus able to demand compensation in order to vote in 
favor of a bill. Second, we want to make sure that returns to vote share 
are not simply proxying returns to ideology. In online appendix figure A8, 
we semi-parametrically regress ARRA receipts per capita at the district 
level on DW-Nominate, controlling for baseline funding formula controls 
in both panels A and B but including linear vote share controls in panel B. 
Liberal members do receive more funds. This is also seen in the first column 
of table 8. However, vote share controls reduce the estimated magnitude 
and take away the statistical significance of DW-Nominate. Moreover, the 
coefficient on DW-Nominate is small and is not statistically significant in 
the per-worker regressions with or without controls. In the second column 
of table 8, we replace DW-Nominate with its absolute value to capture ideo-
logical extremity (as opposed to partisanship). The results are very similar.
The DW-Nominate results are unsurprising, because ARRA was expected 
to pass with a wide margin in the House and thus no single member was 
pivotal. By contrast, in the Senate the administration had to negotiate 
to get three Republicans (Susan Collins of Maine, Olympia Snowe of 
Maine, and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania) to break a potential filibuster. 
Moreover, one conservative Democrat, Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska, 
publicly aired his ambivalence about voting in favor of the bill. In col-
umn 3 of table 8, we put in a dummy for districts located in Pennsylvania 
and Nebraska. Unfortunately, we cannot include the two Maine districts in 
our analysis because both contain part of the state capital. The coefficient 
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on the dummy ranges from -89 to +71 but is far from significant in all 
specifications.
More importantly, in our state-level analysis in table 9, the estimates are 
consistently negative and sometimes statistically significant. We show eight 
results total, four with a dummy for Maine, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska, 
and four with a dummy for only Pennsylvania and Nebraska.27 Estimates 
range from -$41 to -$288 across the CGL and agency data sets and two of 
the seven different results are significant at a 5 percent level or lower. 
In three out of three specifications, adding in Maine lowers the magnitude 
of the coefficients. However, the coefficients are negative in all specifica-
tions. We take this as strong evidence that pivotal states did not receive 
more money. If anything, they received less.
Another measure of whether legislators act in the interests of their party 
is whether they punish party members who deviate from the party line. 
When ARRA was passed, a few legislators voted against the majority of 
their own party: Republicans in the House who abstained from voting 
and in the Senate who even voted for it, and Democrats who abstained 
from voting or voted against the bill. No House Republicans voted for the 
bill; however, two refrained from voting. Additionally, seven Democrats 
voted against the bill, one voted “present,” and one did not vote. Party 
defiers did get less on average than those voting with their parties, in both 
the Democratic and the Republican party. Coefficients are not significant 
at conventional levels and amount to -$86 pooled across parties or -$88 
for Democrat defiers. These results are shown in the last two columns of 
table 8.
Putting in most baseline controls does not dramatically change the esti-
mates. However, adding land area increases coefficient magnitudes. With 
the full set of baseline controls, defiers do get less and results are statisti-
cally significant in per-worker or per-resident specifications at the 5 percent 
level or less. For Democrats, the amounts are -$144. However, looking at 
figure 6 (lower-right panel), we see that with the exception of one outlier, 
Democratic defiers get exactly the expected amount conditional upon vote 
share. Representative Dan Lipinski, a Democrat who represents the Third 
Congressional District in the suburbs of Chicago, was a strong outlier, 
and his district received only $75 per resident. Lipinski voted “present” 
on the bill, and his district received the 17th lowest amount per capita in 
27. Note that the results in the specification, taking out state capitals (fourth row), are 
identical for the regression with Maine and the one without since both Maine districts contain 
part of Kennebec County, which contains the state capital of Augusta. Thus both districts are 
not in the sample.
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Congress. In a median regression, which reduces the influence of outliers, 
the coefficient on voting against party is -$49 per capita and is not statisti-
cally significant at conventional levels (results not shown).
Our results in this section, combined with our results from section IV.E., 
indicate that ARRA funding was not targeted toward or against influential 
members of Congress. This is true whether one considers individuals who 
were in powerful positions in Congress, those pivotal for the vote outcome, 
or those who defied their party.
IV. Interpretations and Implications for Future Policy
To summarize our findings, we find little to no evidence of positive target-
ing of ARRA funds toward powerful individuals in Congress. We also find 
only limited targeting in favor of the party that held the majority in both 
chambers of Congress as well as the presidency. Additionally, we find no 
targeting of funds toward districts that had large increases in unemploy-
ment. Nonetheless, we do find that districts with high levels of employment 
and with a high poverty rate received more funds, though we do not find the 
same correlations across states.
Our findings that party leaders, swing districts, and ideological moder-
ates did not receive more funding and that defiers did not suffer a clear 
penalty may not be surprising to close political observers. This is espe-
cially so given that contracts, grants, and loans were allocated based on 
either formulas or competitive grants. Funding formulas are intentionally 
coarse instruments for the purposes of limiting politically motivated geo-
graphical targeting. At the same time, since formula money is allocated 
by state governors, it is possible to a limited degree for Congress to target 
particular districts in small states by mandating spending in poor areas, 
urban areas, rural areas, areas with large highway systems, and in other 
similar ways. Similarly, while the competitive bidding process limits the 
ability to target specific areas, the choice of projects still allows a degree 
of discretion and thus influence.
Moreover, while targeting individual districts would have been diffi-
cult, the bill could have easily used funding formulas and even competitive 
grants to tilt money strongly toward more Democratic states. The spatial 
outcome for the ARRA spending stands in stark contrast to findings about 
the other large fiscal stimulus in U.S. history: Roosevelt’s New Deal. Fish-
back, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) document that although New Deal loans 
were not politically targeted or targeted to high-unemployment areas, 
grants were targeted both to high unemployment areas and to swing-district 
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supporters of Roosevelt in the prior presidential campaign. In this section, 
we discuss some possible explanations for the limited geographic targeting 
in the ARRA bill, and we consider why the outcome may have been differ-
ent during the New Deal era.
One possible explanation for our results is that the spatial allocation 
reflected the desires of the administration and Congress. As its name sug-
gests, the bill had two components: recovery and reinvestment. While 
some parts of the bill (such as Unemployment Insurance, Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program, and Medicaid) were focused on recovery or 
at least on relief, the CGL component was more focused on reinvestment. 
Certainly, automatic stabilizers, for example, are well targeted to those 
with a high propensity to consume out of income and those in or at risk 
of falling into poverty. Perhaps, then, the spatial allocation of CGL funds 
reflected the variation in local need for public goods and services rather 
than the need for jobs.
However, even though other parts of the bill were better targeted, we 
find it unlikely that the allocation of CGL funds was what the administra-
tion would have preferred in the absence of political constraints. In Jan-
uary of 2009, the unemployment rate in California was 9.7 percent and 
rising rapidly, and the unemployment rate in Michigan was 11.4 percent; 
however, the unemployment rate in North Dakota was 3.9 percent. Many 
schools and highways needed to be rebuilt, and it would not have been 
particularly difficult to use the severity of the business cycle in an area as a 
factor in allocating funds. We think a more plausible argument is that there 
are certain trade-offs that arise when greater targeting in fiscal policies is 
allowed, and the administration’s relatively nontargeted approach reflected 
constraints and not preferences.
Moreover, fine-grained geographic targeting leads to a number of costs. 
First, there may be increased delays in project selection due to bargaining 
between legislators, something that runs counter to rapid enactment in the 
face of a major economic crisis. For example, when Congress tried to set 
aside a portion of the Medicaid money for high-unemployment areas, the 
Senate opted for a lower percentage than the House, and this caused delay 
in bargaining in the conference committee. Second, such discretion may 
lead to precisely the type of political opportunism that is both predicted 
by theories of legislative politics and at least partly confirmed by the New 
Deal experience. Such opportunism could have delegitimized a piece of 
legislation that was already quite controversial and under substantial public 
scrutiny. For these reasons, political constraints—both real or perceived—
may have prevented the administration from engaging in a more targeted 
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approach, so that instead it favored the use of funding formulas and com-
petitive bidding.
In a majoritarian system, where politicians gain reelection in part by 
providing funds to their districts, funding formulas limit the degree to 
which politicians are able to do so. Starting with the Federal Aid Road Act 
of 1916, Congress increasingly used formulas to allocate federal funds. 
Besides attempting to reduce graft, Congress introduced formulas to allo-
cate funds in a more streamlined fashion, allowing it first to decide on the 
level of funding and then to delegate the disbursement of those funds. 
Formula funding allowed Congress to retain control over what types of 
projects are funded while bypassing bargaining over the spatial distribu-
tion of expenditures that politicians may be particularly interested in. Over 
time, the use of formulas has become more prevalent. In addition to allow-
ing for timely passage of legislation, channeling money through existing 
programs in this way has also provided a method for ensuring that funds 
are spent quickly, a goal that was a priority for this particular piece of 
legislation.
However, while a relatively nontargeted approach has merits both in 
reducing the possibility of graft and in possibly expediting the pace of leg-
islation, it comes with costs. In particular, it reduces lawmakers’ ability 
to target based on economic as well as political considerations. It is note-
worthy that while the fiscal stimulus in the New Deal may have provided 
greater awards to swing districts, it also channeled more money to areas of 
higher unemployment. The good news is that political constraints since that 
era appear to have made fiscal policy more politically neutral; the bad news 
is that those constraints may have also reduced countercyclical efficacy.
This has a number of implications for future stimulus bills. First, it 
means that the components of a policy that are better targeted, such as auto-
matic stabilizers, are quite important, and it may be useful to put greater 
weight on these. At the same time, besides automatic stabilizers, there are 
economically sensible reasons to increase public goods provision as part of 
countercyclical policy, as discussed by J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence 
Summers (2012). The relevant hurdle rate for such public-goods projects 
effectively falls, and an optimal fiscal policy should likely include an 
expansion in the funding of such projects. However, it should be possible 
to include local area unemployment rates, or other transparent measures of 
excess capacity, as a factor in the funding allocation for contracts, grants, 
and loans. Such an approach would combine the virtues of a more rules-
based policy regime with some of the gains from a more targeted vari-
ant of stimulus policy. Had we found that the political process generated 
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sufficient demand for added funding in harder-hit areas, the need for such 
an explicit rule would not arise. However, that is not what we found, sug-
gesting that the inclusion of local excess capacity measures in funding for-
mulas is likely to have a substantial payoff.
Moreover, we note that in the ARRA stimulus the government relied on 
already existing funding formulas to disperse the funds. This means the 
time for updating formulas—in order to better accommodate the objectives 
of countercyclical fiscal policy—is probably now, before the next crisis 
hits. Of course, this presupposes understanding how to create new legisla-
tive norms.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have looked at the spatial distribution of ARRA funds, both 
to assess how the bill was targeted economically and politically and as a 
window for evaluating theories of political economy. We find that the funds 
were distributed relatively equally across states. Moreover, dropping a small 
number of outlier districts that each received money for a particular large 
project, we find that funds were distributed relatively equally across con-
gressional districts as well. We find no evidence that funds were funneled 
toward powerful or pivotal legislators, nor do we find that funds were 
withheld by parties to punish members of Congress who defied them. 
We do find that urban Democratic districts received a moderately higher 
amount of funding per capita, although most of this gap between Repub-
licans and Democrats disappears when we control for a small number 
of district or state characteristics that appeared in the formulas used to 
allocate funds.
We also find that formulas based upon welfare programs administered at 
the state level are very useful in explaining cross-state variation in funding; 
poverty rates and employment, which also are pervasively used in federal 
formulas, are strongly predictive of the cross-district variation. Comparing 
the targeting of discretionary funds under ARRA with that under New Deal 
legislation, we find the two episodes bear little resemblance. Grants under 
the New Deal appear to have been targeted both to higher unemployment 
areas as well as to swing district supporters of President Franklin Roosevelt. 
The reduced political and cyclical targeting in the ARRA may reflect a 
more rules-based environment today compared to the 1930s, and it may 
also explain the lower amount of variation across space in federal trans-
fers and loans. We hope that future stimulus policies will increase counter-
cyclical targeting by explicitly using measures of local unemployment and 
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excess capacity as part of the allocation of contracts, grants, and loans. This 
was done in the allocation of Medicaid funds already in ARRA.
We view our findings and their contrast with the empirical literature on 
targeting in the Great Depression as evidence of a shift in social norms 
over the allocation of federal funds. However, we would like to see more 
conclusive evidence on the role of social norms. More broadly, we see our 
findings as a call for continued empirical research on the distribution of 
funds. If there has been a large shift in norms, have norms within the legis-
lature shifted? Or does the norms shift lie in the public? Alternatively, has 
the presence of pork lessened over time due to greater coverage of politics 
in the media (Levitt and Snyder 1995)? These are questions that we hope 
empirical political economists will address.
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1. Not that policymakers got everything right (myself very much included in being 
wrong). The basic design of the stimulus bill involved an emphasis on being “temporary, 
targeted, and timely.” That design reflected a forecast and associated policy error: along with 
forecasts from other government agencies such as the Fed and the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), the Administration’s economic forecasts and also its policy stances did not 
adequately reflect the possibility of an L-shaped rather than a V-shaped recovery. In retro-
spect, it would have been relatively inexpensive to have tied continuation of various com-
ponents of the stimulus bill to cyclical indicators like the unemployment rate—which would 
Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
PETER R. ORSZAG  Christopher Boone, Arindrajit Dube, and Ethan 
Kaplan have done a compelling job in analyzing the variation in the dis-
cretionary component of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(hereafter the “stimulus bill”) and finding that the pattern of spending per 
resident across congressional districts and across states does not appear 
to conform to a variety of traditional political economy theories. As some-
one who was directly involved in the legislative process associated with the 
stimulus bill, I am not surprised by these findings.
A core motivation behind the stimulus bill was to have it take effect 
rapidly, given the dire condition of the economy at the time. Indeed, we 
now know the situation was even worse than understood at the time. For 
example, the Blue Chip economic forecast released on December 10, 2008, 
suggested the economy was contracting that quarter at about a 4 percent 
seasonally adjusted annualized rate. GDP was actually falling at about 
twice that rate. Similarly, that same December 2008 Blue Chip forecast 
suggested that during the first quarter of 2009 GDP would decline by about 
2½ percent; the reality was again twice that (CEA 2014, table 3-1). Put 
simply, the incoming economics team at the White House knew that stimu-
lus was urgent—and in retrospect that urgency was more than justified.1
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In this context, policymakers were highly motivated to avoid the “inside 
lag” curse that has historically undermined the effectiveness of discretion-
ary fiscal policy interventions. As Federal Reserve Board Governor Ned 
Gramlich put it, “For fiscal policy, the time between recognition and action 
is long in parliamentary countries, seemingly interminable in the United 
States. . . . At best this component of the inside lag for U.S. discretionary 
fiscal policy is about a year, already longer than the average recession, and 
the lag can be substantially longer than that if the relevant action is at all 
controversial” (Gramlich 1999). Those types of timing issues caused Alan 
Blinder to write in 2004 that “at least in the United States, long political 
lags may be the most cogent argument against discretionary fiscal policy” 
(Blinder 2004, p. 8).
From this perspective, the stimulus bill was a resounding success. In 
December 2008, the Obama transition team proposed the overall scope 
and elements of the stimulus. President Obama was inaugurated on Janu-
ary 20, 2009, and on January 26 Representative David Obey got the 
legislative ball on the stimulus formally rolling by introducing HR1. The 
final legislation was signed just 3 weeks later, on February 17. All told, it 
took only about 2 months from initial proposal to the signing ceremony— 
a dramatic counterexample to the general concern that Edward Gramlich 
and Alan Blinder properly highlight based on previous fiscal policy episodes.
To enact legislation that quickly, the only choice was to rely on simple, 
existing approaches to allocating the funds. Optimizing the allocation, to 
achieve either political or economic objectives like the ones examined by 
Boone, Dube, and Kaplan, would unacceptably slow down the process and 
thereby not be optimal from either perspective given the urgency of the 
situation. The result was that the funds were distributed relatively equally 
across states and districts.
then have avoided the subsequent legislative wrangling and unnecessary fiscal drag in 2011 
and 2012. For example, in January 2009, the CBO projected the 2012 unemployment rate 
to be 6.8 percent. In reality, the unemployment rate averaged 8.1 percent in 2012. A policy 
of continuing in full certain payments (such as the extended and expanded unemployment 
benefits or the state fiscal assistance contained in the stimulus bill) as long as the unemploy-
ment rate remained over a certain threshold (say, 7.5 percent) and then phasing the payments 
out as the unemployment rate declined to a lower threshold would have carried a relatively 
small score from CBO (which would have assigned a cost based on the probability mass 
associated with unemployment being above the trigger thresholds). Policy analysts should 
give more thought to the design (for example, whether one should use the unemployment 
rate or the employment-population ratio) of such temporary automatic stabilizers so that they 
could be easily incorporated into future discretionary spending actions similar to the stimulus 
bill should the need arise.
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For example, my figure 1 shows a scatterplot of the discretionary spend-
ing examined by the authors, by state and the state populations. A simple 
regression of these variables shows that across states, population alone 
explains almost 95 percent of the variation in total discretionary spending. 
That is precisely what one would expect from a rough-and-ready approach 
intended to avoid the inside lag problem; speed meant relying on existing 
formulas, and most of the formulas for discretionary spending allocations 
give a substantial weight to population.
Yet the paper’s authors focus their analysis disproportionately on spend-
ing per resident, which is similar in spirit to examining the residuals that 
make up the other 5 percent of the variation in total spending in the figure. 
In particular, the primary focus of the analysis in the paper is spending per 
resident across congressional districts, which in turn raises another issue: 
that the House was not the binding political constraint.2
Source: Recovery.gov.
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2. The authors note that when dummy variables are included for 17 district outliers 
(driven largely by competitive grants that happened to be won by entities in the districts), the 
bulk of the variation across congressional districts is driven effectively by population, which 
is similar to the results at the state level.
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On January 20, 2009, there were 256 Democrats in the House and 
178 Republicans; and the rules of the House meant that with full Demo-
cratic support, the House would pass the stimulus bill. The situation in the 
Senate was much different, however. There were officially 57 Democrats 
and 41 Republicans; but the rules of the Senate, such as the filibuster pro-
cedure, meant that some Republican votes would be necessary in order 
for the Senate to pass the bill.
Not surprisingly, therefore, most of the administration’s attention was on 
how to get the bill through the Senate. That fact did not go unnoticed in the 
House. Several administration officials (including me) were the target of 
much displeasure surrounding the perceived (and real) focus on the Senate. 
As Representative Charlie Rangel of New York has been quoted as saying, 
the House “was way beyond frustration. Whichever senator wants to be 
wooed, we’re just supposed to accept it” (Grunwald 2012, p. 232)
An interesting political question, therefore, is how the swing votes in 
the Senate decided to use their leverage. For example, Senator Olympia 
Snowe of Maine used her influence to insist that a patch for the Alterna-
tive Minimum Tax be included within the “total” for the stimulus bill.3 
Senator Susan Collins of Maine curtailed a proposal for school construc-
tion.4 And Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania insisted on $10 billion 
in temporary funding for the National Institutes of Health.5 None of these 
uses of political capital by the senators who held the legislation’s fate 
in their hands (because their votes were the marginal ones necessary 
for enactment) generated disproportionate benefits for their home states. 
Instead, the swing senators appear to have been motivated by other policy 
considerations.
In sum, the binding political constraint on the stimulus legislation was 
the Senate, and the urgency of the situation limited the maneuvering room 
for deviating from simple rules, with the result that the vast majority of 
the geographical variation in spending across the United States can be 
explained simply by population. In that context, it is perhaps not particu-
larly surprising that the authors’ attempt to find strong evidence of various 
political economy theories by examining per-resident spending across 
congressional districts finds little such evidence.
3. “Senate Passes $838 Billion Stimulus Bill.” Associated Press report dated February 
11, 2009.
4. “Senate Cuts School Construction from Stimulus Plan.” Architectural Record, 
February 6, 2009.
5. “Specter, a Fulcrum of the Stimulus Bill, Pulls Off a Coup for Health Money.” New 
York Times, February 13, 2009.
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COMMENT BY
ERIK SNOWBERG  Very little research has sought to test theories of 
distributive politics. In the United States, this is largely due to the dif-
ficulty of accurately measuring the level of spending across different 
Congressional districts.
This paper, by Christopher Boone, Arindrajit Dube, and Ethan Kaplan, 
reminds us why such tests, despite their practical difficulty, are important. 
The finding that canonical models of distributive politics fail to provide 
useful predictions about the allocation of spending in the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is striking and significant.1 It would 
be too easy, as the other discussant has done, to make excuses for these 
models by claiming that the authors have missed some important trees by 
looking at the forest of data, or to simply dismiss these models as irrel-
evant. What is more difficult, if the authors’ conclusions are representative 
of general phenomena, is to use them to refine our models.
Here I will argue that incorporating the negotiating skills of legislators 
into existing models can go a long way toward understanding the authors’ 
findings. Although much of the following logic is easily formalized, it is 
essentially a story that gives a passable reading of the facts rather than a 
theory.2
1. The fact that normative economic theories fail to provide a useful guide to understand-
ing implemented policy should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with either the public 
choice literature or legislators themselves.
2. The idea that skills, or “valence,” may be an important component of political economy 
models dates back to Stokes (1963), although research in this vein has tended to focus on the 
electoral, rather than policy, consequences of valence (see Groseclose 2001). More recent 
work has put more structure on these skills (Besley 2007), often in an attempt to explain 
incompetent or corrupt politicians (Mattozzi and Merlo 2008; Bernheim and Kartik 2014).
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neGotiAtinG SkiLLS. While there are many skills that would serve a leg-
islator well, it is sufficient to focus on the ability to negotiate transfers 
for one’s legislative district. If voters value transfers to their districts 
highly—and by all accounts, in the United States they do—then they should 
elect the most skilled candidate they can. Some states and districts happen to 
have very skilled candidates to choose from, but not all can be lucky enough 
to have an Alfonse D’Amato (R–NY), Robert Byrd (D–WV), or Don Young 
(R–AK) standing for office. A first pass assumes that these skills are ran-
domly distributed among candidates, and thus among districts. Moreover, 
the variance of skills in the legislature would be increased by imperfect infor-
mation about the precise skill levels of candidates standing for office. This 
comports well with the authors’ finding that although there is a large amount 
of variance in transfers received by a district under the ARRA, very little of 
it can be explained by canonical models of distributive politics.
How much do negotiating skills matter? Under the United States Con-
stitution, Congress is free to structure most aspects of lawmaking. In 
equilibrium, the proportion of funds distributed by negotiation versus the 
proportion distributed (relatively evenly) by formulas should thus accord 
with the preferences of some pivotal legislator.3
If there is some disutility associated with the effort entailed in negotiat-
ing, the pivotal legislators’ preferences will be proportional to the skill gap 
between themselves and the average legislator. If the pivotal legislator is 
more skilled than average, he or she would prefer a greater portion of funds 
to be distributed by negotiation, whereas if the pivotal legislator possesses 
subpar skills, he or she would prefer that all funds be allocated by formulas.
This observation may be useful in explaining the gradual embrace of 
funding formulas pointed out by the authors. Between the New Deal and 
today, Congress has become increasingly professionalized. This, in con-
junction with the decline of both political machines in northern cities and 
of the “solid south,” would have led to a tightening of the distribution of 
skills in Congress. According to the logic above, this would lead to an 
increasing proportion of funds distributed by formulas.
RoLe of conGReSSionAL LeAdeRShiP. It is likely that members of the Con-
gressional leadership have an increased capacity to negotiate funds for their 
3. Following Downs (1957), the legislator with the median level of skills is an attractive 
candidate for the pivotal legislator. However, given leadership’s control of the legislative 
agenda and superior skill, especially in the House, the pivotal legislator may be significantly 
more skilled than the median-skilled legislator (Cox and McCubbins 2005). This is easily 
modeled as a weighted voting procedure where legislators in the leadership, or with greater 
skill, receive greater weights.
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districts. What, then, should we make of the authors’ finding that members 
of the Congressional leadership seemed to have received no more funds 
from the ARRA than the average Congressmember? This could be a failure 
of the logic that has taken us to this point, but in keeping with the focus of 
this discussion, I prefer to think of it arising from an errant assumption in 
the canonical model of legislative bargaining.
In particular, David Baron and John Ferejohn (1989) assume that legis-
lators only care about transfers to their own districts. This assumption is of 
solid provenance, rooted in David Mayhew’s (1974) characterization of 
members of Congress as “single-minded seekers of reelection.” But where 
might the minds of Congress members reasonably assured of reelection 
wander? Many members in “safe” districts aspire to the leadership, and 
those that succeed likely possess greater skill. But earning and maintain-
ing a leadership position requires doing favors for members of the leader’s 
caucus. If the leadership devotes its “surplus” skills to securing funds for 
important members of its caucus, then we would expect to see the leader-
ship receive no more funds than average. This, coupled with the fact that 
the Democrats ran the House during the writing and passage of the ARRA, 
may account for the excess spending in Democratic districts.4
In conclusion, the results under discussion present a challenge to the 
canonical models of political economy. I have presented one possible way 
of accommodating these results. However, the additional element focused 
on here—negotiating skill—may not be the most important thing missing 
from these theories. On the other hand, it is possible that I have not pushed 
this perspective far enough—for example, areas with more economic activ-
ity also have higher levels of human capital. Thus, these districts may have 
a pool of potential candidates with greater political skills, leading to more 
transfers, in accordance with the authors’ findings.5
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  Alan Blinder found himself persuaded by 
discussant Peter Orszag’s critique of the paper, but wanted to defend the 
authors for considering the element of political braggadocio in general. 
Several congressional staffers had told Blinder they had written the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) themselves—perhaps 
an exaggeration but probably a claim with some truth. Following standard 
political economy theory, he said, one would expect the House version 
of the bill to put more money into districts with members serving on the 
Ways and Means or Appropriations committee or, generally, in the House 
leadership. That the authors’ analysis did not find such effects was a 
surprising and, to him, heartening finding.
Henry Aaron said that while he accepted Orszag’s narrative of what 
transpired politically with ARRA, namely that the White House con-
centrated on persuading the Senate to get it passed quickly, might one 
not also assume that bargaining was going on among elected officials, 
including in the House, about the distribution? If that were the case, the 
appropriate universe to examine would not be the discretionary spending 
categories but the relative sizes of the various elements of ARRA, which 
may have been bargained over. After all, one could have had more or 
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less tax cuts, and one could pour more or less money into unemployment 
insurance or food stamps or even Medicaid.
Justin Wolfers thought the paper demonstrated the failure of a major 
branch of social science, since the authors had thrown at the data nearly 
every standard political economy model as well as the standard eco-
nomic models, and still they came up with basically none of the pre-
dicted results. He agreed with Orszag that the analysis would do better 
to examine particular senators, although even then the same models 
would fail. Senator Arlen Specter, for example, was not trying to get 
himself reelected or to get others elected at the time but only seeking 
more funding for the National Institutes of Health. Wolfers wondered 
whether, alternatively, there might have been something special about 
the ARRA and whether the standard models would perform better in 
analyzing other stimulus bills.
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich pointed out that the highway money in the 
bill actually had to be appropriated by states by the end of 2010. If it is 
difficult to find enough projects in high-unemployment areas, then geo-
graphic spillovers may justify spending where unemployment is lower. 
He also questioned whether the goal of responding to high-impact areas 
should be met by targeted project spending or, instead, through programs 
like unemployment insurance, food stamps, or welfare. According to the 
Economic Report of the President, excluding the AMT, about a sixth of the 
ARRA is in the form of unemployment insurance, food stamps, or TANF 
payments. The unemployment insurance extensions passed by Congress 
after the ARRA further shifted the overall spending mix toward harder-hit 
areas. Chodorow-Reich noted possible trade-offs in targeting certain areas 
through project aid as opposed to these other measures, such as different 
effects on labor supply. Did ARRA strike the right balance between those 
trade-offs, or are there better ways to do it?
Jay Shambaugh recalled how the states’ departments of transportation 
later stated that money that passed through formulas the way some ARRA 
funds were arranged was easier to spend, that is, it was distributed faster 
than it would have been through a new process.
Daniel Sichel wondered whether the paper’s prior assumptions had 
been correctly established from the start. The authors seemed to point to 
the New Deal stimulus as a standard model of political and economic-
impact targeting that people expected to see replicated in ARRA. They 
were surprised to find that we are no longer living in that political world, but 
were their initial priors reasonable? Until he read Joshua Hausman’s paper 
on veterans’ bonuses during the Great Depression, Sichel had thought 
438 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2014
there had not been much fiscal policy practiced during that period. Were 
there other, more recent fiscal policy episodes in which political targeting 
was evident? Possibly political targeting should not have been expected 
and, on the contrary, the way this bill unfolded was just the way it’s 
always been.
Alice Rivlin, echoing Sichel’s comment, was surprised by discussant Erik 
Snowberg’s shock at the idea that Congress would want to tie its hands. 
Congress, in her experience, is fond of tying its hands, in part because 
the alternative is perpetual fighting, and Congress has learned over the 
years that fighting is politically costly. The spending formulas them-
selves are evidence that they wanted to tie their hands, and the paper 
seemed proof to her that Congress did so quite effectively in 2009. She 
added that since then, Congress’s dedication to this approach has grown 
even stronger, with earmarks becoming a no-no; in her view, this has 
been a loss in some respects.
Gary Burtless returned to the topic of ARRA’s spending composition 
and to the fact that the entitlement spending was determined by formula. 
In some cases, the entitlement stimulus was more generous for states that 
adopted policies agreeable to the Democratic majority in Congress. He 
cited the Medicaid match formula, which was temporarily made much 
more generous to each state, but only if the state did not make Medicaid 
eligibility more restrictive and if it continued to make prompt payments 
to medical providers. Likewise, in order to maximize the value of federal 
stimulus assistance for unemployment compensation, a state had to lib-
eralize the triggering mechanism for the federal-state Extended Benefit 
program and change certain eligibility conditions for regular unemploy-
ment benefits. States that failed to take these steps could receive federal 
funding for emergency extensions of unemployment benefits, but they 
received less federal help than they would have if they had liberalized 
their regular and Extended Benefit programs. Cumulatively, over the 
recession, the added federal aid to states that made more generous pro-
vision for Medicaid and unemployment insurance could provide states 
with a great deal of money. Burtless believed that when the Democrats in 
Congress passed the stimulus package they must have recognized that in 
party bastions, like Albany and Sacramento, the legislatures were going 
to make the desired policy changes in order to qualify for the maximum 
allowable federal assistance.
Gregory Mankiw suggested that since the paper found that a lot of the 
stimulus was determined by rules after all, another paper deserves to be 
written, namely to identify what the best rule would be. He did not find 
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the idea of targeting stimulus to wherever unemployment was particularly 
high to be convincing. If this last recession had been a Keynesian-style 
demand recession and unemployment had simply been higher in some 
places than in others, that suggestion would make sense, but in fact there 
were also longer-term structural changes, with growing areas and shrink-
ing areas. It makes little sense to put money into building a lot of infra-
structure in a region where unemployment is currently high if the economy 
there has also been experiencing long-term shrinkage. The places where 
new infrastructure is needed are actually the growing areas.
Caroline Hoxby raised some red flags regarding how stimulus funds get 
spent. Even when the federal government does do a good job of targeting—
apparently maximizing the multiplier—states can undo it, she argued. Not 
all stimulus money sticks where it hits. She offered an example from her 
own research on the Pell grant, which was one of ARRA’s major funding 
items. Raising the grant would seem to maximize the multiplier, because 
the money was directed to low-income students, young people who would 
spend it rather than saving it. But she had found that this stimulus caused 
states to take away the same amount of money from universities, dollar for 
dollar, by reducing appropriations. States also did this in response to other 
federal grants under ARRA.
Robert Gordon returned to a thought raised by Chodorow-Reich regard-
ing fiscal multipliers. He recalled that in the summer of 2010, Blinder and 
Mark Zandi wrote a paper rating the effects of an array of multipliers 
in fiscal stimulus bills and found that the champion multipliers were 
food stamps and unemployment insurance. They also found that cuts 
in corporate taxes and personal taxes on the rich ranked at the very 
bottom. He posed a question to Orszag: Did he think the ARRA had 
maximized the multiplier, and if not, what were the political constraints 
preventing that?
Orszag spoke in response to that and several other comments. The ARRA 
multiplier was not in fact maximized, he said, since many of the spending 
approaches that would have ranked higher were precluded to obtain politi-
cal support. If he were to grade the final version of the bill from a multi-
plier perspective, he would award it a B-. Referring to Hoxby’s comment, 
he said the White House understood that sometimes the money does not 
stick to its target. State fiscal relief had been ranked near the top, and they 
tried to maximize that, but there they ran into other political economy con-
straints. On the other hand, given the very rapid two-month inside lag, he 
felt the multiplier-weighted average was fairly good. He referred everyone 
to the Economic Report of the President, which he believed did a good job 
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of rebutting the claim that the stimulus was completely ineffective, includ-
ing because states zeroed out the funds’ stimulative effect.
Orszag added that in retrospect, the biggest problem with the stimulus 
was neither the weakness of the multiplier nor the amount of stimulus 
delivered in the fourth quarter of 2009 but, rather, how little of it was deliv-
ered in 2010 and 2011. Since the recession turned out to be an L-shaped 
rather than a V-shaped scenario, the ex-post temporary and timely target-
ing was exactly the wrong approach.
He reiterated a point from his prepared comment, that while not every 
macroeconomist misunderstood the crisis, every macroeconometric model 
had gotten it wrong, leading policymakers to overlook an option they 
could have purchased at a very low price, namely to have included con-
ditional extensions of entitlements like unemployment insurance, basing 
them on the changing state of the labor market. Finally, he said there were 
also some elements included in ARRA which, while relatively low multi-
pliers at the time, did have some longer-term structural benefits, such as 
funding for electronic health records, whose rapid adoption, he feels, has 
contributed to the deceleration in the country’s health care costs.
Ethan Kaplan responded to many of the points raised as well. He and his 
coauthors agree with Orszag both that seeking a short political lag was very 
important and that the population across states could serve as a powerful 
predictor of how much money states received. They believe ARRA was 
probably relatively successful at reducing lag times and that it was defi-
nitely successful at fighting pork. What surprised them, however, was that 
this was different from the way such bills used to be developed.
Nevertheless, Kaplan and his coauthors concluded that this likely was 
not an economically optimal way to distribute the funds. Simple modifi-
cations could be made to formulas that would not cause time to be lost to 
bargaining or lead to pork-barrel spending but would still target better. 
While the Administration did not intend all the ARRA money to be 
targeted to high-unemployment areas, even nontargeted portions like the 
funds for highway miles were prioritized for places under economic dis-
tress as defined by the 1965 highway act. Kaplan felt that targeting through 
formulas tied to cyclical downturns, as was done in the bill’s Medicaid 
portion, was better. This is why he did not see what would be so difficult 
about including unemployment insurance.
Responding to Snowberg’s comment, Kaplan pointed out that the 
stimulus’s shape was not necessarily just up to legislators, but depended 
on the Administration as well. President Obama rejected earmarks from 
the outset and instructed Congress to apply only formula grants and 
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competitive grants, and that is how the final bill turned out. In response 
to Chodorow-Reich, Kaplan said he and his coauthors were not arguing 
that every dollar should have been spent in the highest-unemployment 
area, since that could have led to capacity constraints. But they agreed 
with what most people were arguing, namely that it would have been 
preferable to put more money into high-unemployment areas than into 
low-unemployment areas.
Kaplan pointed out that the paper did indeed include some state-level 
analysis, and said they found very little political influence there. The fact 
that Maine, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania did not walk away with any excess 
of funds made this clear. What members of Congress probably did do is 
alter what types of funding were chosen, as Orszag pointed out and indeed 
witnessed. The fact that states with pivotal senatorial votes did not receive 
greater levels of funding was probably due to the rise of formula usage and 
reflects a shift from politicians fighting over funds for their constituencies 
to fighting for funds for projects they ideologically support.
Finally, Kaplan noted that while many Republican governors initially 
said they were going to refuse ARRA funds, in the end all 50 states accepted 
most funds, including one state that was ordered by the courts to do so. 
If their study had taken account of the money rejected by Republican gov-
ernors, and therefore missing from many Republican districts, he said, it 
would have shown even less targeting to Democrats than the paper reported.

